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Abstract 
Since 1995, the government has launched brownfield financing programs to promote 
brownfield cleanup and redevelopment in the United States.  These programs have 
lowered financial barriers for brownfield developers and returned vibrant properties to 
communities. 
 
In this study, I focus on examining the efficiency of these incentives from the social 
perspective and proposing optimal funding decision rules.  I hypothesize that brownfield 
funds are not allocated optimally in some cases.  First, I investigate the current 
brownfield financing programs at federal, state, and local levels.  Second, based on 
externality and welfare economics theories, I propose an optimal funding-decision flow 
chart.  Third, by testing my hypothesis on three brownfield cases in Massachusetts, I 
perform social benefit-cost analyses and determine whether brownfield funds were 
justified by their social returns.  Finally, I discuss the major findings from these case 
studies and point out ways to improve current brownfield financial and non-financial 
policies. 
 
Based on theoretical analyses, I propose that the government should not sponsor 
projects with positive private net present values, but rather focus on projects that have 
positive net present social values and not feasible without subsidies.  In the real world, it 
is difficult to measure the social benefits of a brownfield redevelopment accurately, 
especially before a development project is completed.  Hedonic models show that only 
one of three cases exhibit significant positive enhancement on housing values after 
redevelopment.  Only development of a simple rule-of-thumb benefit assessment toll 
would make an optimal brownfield funding decision possible. 
 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Karen R. Polenske, Professor of Regional Political Economy and 
Planning, Department of Urban Studies and Planning 
Thesis Reader: David Geltner, Professor and Director, Center for Real Estate  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background 
 
The deindustrialization in the United States led to the shift of manufacturing industries 
away first to the South and then to Asia, which left a great amount of vacant and polluted 
land (brownfield), especially in the Northeast of the United States.  The legacies from 
deindustrialization have become a stigma for communities.  It is not just an eyesore, but 
reduces tax revenues, impacts neighbor properties values, and poses a threat to human 
health.  Since 1995, the government has mitigated the liabilities and provided financial 
assistances for brownfield redevelopment.  These programs have promoted brownfield 
cleanup and redevelopment and boosted economic development and job growth. 
In this study, I focus on financial incentives for brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment in the United States.  From the social perspective, I examine the 
efficiency of brownfield funding allocation mechanisms and explore how to improve the 
system so as to maximize the social benefits.  My hypothesis is that brownfield funds 
may not be allocated optimally in some cases.  
1.1 Methodologies 
I use case studies, benefit-cost analysis, and hedonic models to obtain my research 
findings.   
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Case studies 
To support my hypothesis, I select three brownfield redevelopment cases in 
Massachusetts from EPA brownfield success stories to analyze the public benefits and 
costs.  The EPA Region One brownfield website provides background information of the 
site and redevelopment (Source: http://www.epa.gov/NE/brownfields).  I conduct the 
interviews with local planner to obtain further information.  
Benefit-Cost Analysis 
I examine public benefits and costs of the three brownfield cases and calculate the net 
present social values (NPSV).  The public costs are the amount of public funds invested 
in a brownfield redevelopment project.  I ignore indirect costs of a redevelopment, such 
as infrastructure, traffic, noise, and new pollution problems.  Due to resource limitations, 
I only consider the local residents’ benefits from brownfield redevelopment and omit the 
benefits for local business and the general public.  The core part of this study is to 
measure public benefits, since the costs are straightforward. 
Hedonic Model 
I employ hedonic models to measure indirectly local residents’ benefits from brownfield 
cleanup and redevelopment.  The price-distance slope reflects residents’ willingness to 
pay for living farther away from the brownfield before remediation.  The slope decrease 
after remediation should represent the brownfield redevelopment’s impact on housing 
price.  By aggregating the price change for each house in the impact region, I derive the 
local residents’ benefits from brownfield remediation and redevelopment.  
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1.2 Data and Software 
Housing transaction data are provided by the Warren Group (2006).  I obtain 
background information of the three brownfield redevelopment cases from the EPA 
Region One website and local planning agencies.  I use ArcGIS and U.S. Streetmap to 
perform the GIS analyses and use SPSS as the statistical analysis tool. 
1.3 Overview of Chapters 
The framework of the remaining chapters is as follows. 
In Chapter 2, I first elaborate the background for brownfield regulations, the stakeholders 
in brownfield redevelopment, and the government’s roles in aligning the interests of all 
the parties.  Then, I detail the special costs for brownfield developers and review current 
financing programs.  Finally, I analyze the pros and cons of current incentives. 
In Chapter 3, I first provide a theoretical framework for the analysis, including 
externalities and market efficiency.  Based on the theoretical analysis, I propose an 
optimal brownfield financing-decision flow chart.  Finally, I introduce my hypothesis and 
research methodologies, including case studies, benefit-costs analyses and hedonic 
models.   
In Chapter 4, I use single-family housing transaction data to perform hedonic analyses to 
obtain local residents’ benefits from brownfield redevelopment.  Based on public costs 
and benefits, I calculate the return for the public from brownfield redevelopment.  In 
conclusion, I summarize the findings from the case studies and provide a caution when 
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interpreting the results. 
In Chapter 5, I first reiterate the major findings of this study, then, I point out the issues 
concerning the methodologies I used, and, finally, I propose policy recommendations.  
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 Chapter 2  
Brownfield Financing in the United States 
 
The financial obstacle for brownfield redevelopment is the extra costs related to 
brownfields, such as site assessment and remediation that they incur.  These costs 
make brownfield projects difficult to compete with greenfield development in comparable 
locations.  Since 1995, many federal and local programs have been established to 
provide financial assistance to brownfield developers to promote brownfield 
redevelopment.  In this chapter, I first brief the background of brownfield financing 
programs and their roles in aligning all the parties’ interests in brownfield redevelopment.  
Then, I point out the special costs for brownfield redevelopment and review current 
brownfield financing programs in the United States, both at the federal and local levels.  
I conclude this chapter by examining pros and cons of brownfield financing programs. 
 
2.1 Background 
This section describes the history of brownfield regulations and the goals of four 
stakeholders in brownfield redevelopment.  
  
2.1.1 What is a Brownfield? 
Brownfield is a property with the pollution imposed by previous industrial activities, but 
the level of pollution is less than Superfund sites, which are the most polluted sites listed 
on the National Priority List (NPL).  Based on HRS (hazard ranking score), those 
polluted sites with HRS over 28.5 will pose immediate or substantial threat to human 
health and will be categorized in NPL (Wang et al. 1998).  EPA will use Superfund 
programs to finance or perform the clean-up activities and sue the responsible parties to 
recover clean-up costs.  Other polluted sites with HRS lower than 28.5 will be subject to 
state legislatures.  
The official definition of brownfield by the U.S. EPA is “real property, the expansion, 
redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential 
presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant” (The Small Business 
Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act 2002).  The National Roundtable on 
the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE 2005) defines brownfield as “an abandoned, 
vacant, derelict or underutilized commercial or industrial property where past actions 
have resulted in actual or perceived contamination and where there is an active potential 
for redevelopment”.   People often use “Brownfield” as contaminated land or land with 
existing structures, by contrast to "Greenfield” (undeveloped land).  There are other 
interchangeable or similar Items, such as “Improvement Areas”, “Special Sites”, “Smart 
Growth Opportunities”, and signature sites, impacted sites (Newfoundland) 
(aboutREMEDIATION 2005).  In developing countries, such as China, there is no 
academically recognized term for brownfield.  
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2.1.2 Brief History of Regulations on Brownfields and Superfund Sites 
Before 1976, the disposal of industrial and hazardous wastes was unregulated in the 
United States (Simons 1998).  RCRA (the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) 
was passed in 1976, followed by the Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act—CERCLA, known as Superfund Law in 1980, to hold 
polluters responsible for cleaning up the pollution they produced.  While RCRA imposes 
stringent regulations on the generation, transport, treatment, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes, CERCLA elaborates “expansive liability on a diverse number of parties 
contributing to the hazardous substances”, so-called “strict, retroactive, joint, and 
severable liability” (Simons 1998).  The Superfund law has been a major obstacle for 
brownfield redevelopment, because it imposes liabilities to any party in the chain of title, 
whether or not they contributed to the pollution or not.  Furthermore, RCRA and 
CERCLA allow for federal, state, and local governments and private parties to sue 
potential responsible parties for the clean-up or reimbursement of cleanup costs (Simons 
1998).  This makes it impossible for developers to settle liability waivers from all 
potential parties.  The Superfund alone costs about $1.5 billion annually, while it only 
accounts for a small percentage of the approximately 450,000 brownfields in the United 
States (EPA 2002).  
Realizing the obstacles imposed on brownfield redevelopment and neighborhood 
revitalization, the inflexible Superfund law since 1995 has begun to be replaced by state 
voluntary cleanup programs (VCPs) for non-NPL sites (brownfields).  In 1995, EPA 
removed 20,000 sites from CERCLA and promoted revitalization of these less polluted 
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properties (Lange and McNeil 2004).  VCPs are enacted to remove the impediments in 
brownfield redevelopment, including legal liability mitigation, technical assistance, and 
economic incentives.  VCPs employ risk-based cleanup standards, which make clear 
for developers the remediation level and potential cleanup costs.  States will issue a 
closure letter to notify developers that the remediation requirements are met.  There are 
two types of state closure letters, i.e. NFA (no further action) and CNTS (covenant not to 
sue) (McCarthy, 2001).  An NFA is issued by state agencies or certified private 
consultants to certify that no further action is required on the site “regarding the remedial 
action just completed” (Simons 1998).  CNTS ensures all the state agencies not to sue 
in the future, except for certain conditions (reopeners).  A Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with EPA further binds EPA not to sue the owner in the future.  
VCPs also offer lenders and new owners exemptions from liabilities (McCarthy, 2001).  
In 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law “The Small Business Liability Relief 
and Brownfields Revitalization Act,” which grants federal liabilities relief and expands 
economic assistance to brownfield developers.    
2.1.3 Major Obstacles for Brownfield Redevelopment 
Liabilities and the extra costs associated with cleanup are the major obstacles for 
brownfield redevelopment.  Developers of brownfields are confronted with higher 
development costs than developers of conventional development projects.  The 
obstacles are especially larger for projects in non-prime locations and distressed areas, 
where brownfield cleanup and compliance costs make the financial situations even 
worse.  In prime locations, remediation costs may be absorbed by the revenues from 
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the strong market.  However, the liabilities create great uncertainties for developers, 
lenders, and equity investors even in these locations.  It is very difficult to predict the 
cleanup and compliance costs beforehand.  The Federal government can step in and 
hold developers responsible for new pollution problems, and individuals can sue 
developers and request them to compensate for their health problems.  Before 1996, 
even lenders foreclose brownfield properties could enter the liability chain.  The lender 
and fiduciary liabilities were waived via the passage of Asset Conservation, Lender 
Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996 (McCarthy 2001).  With high 
uncertainties and perceived risks, the costs of capital for brownfield projects are much 
higher, which result in the failure of brownfield project to pass feasibility studies by 
developers and investors.  Besides the liabilities and costs, the prolonged timing makes 
developers stay away from brownfields.  The timing is critical for the real estate industry.  
Developers would like to move ahead with projects if they sense the market will become 
favorable.  However, the additional entitlement procedures, such as assessing the site 
and obtaining an NFA, will prolong the delivery period (McCarthy, 2001).  
2.1.4 Stakeholders and Their Perspectives in Brownfield Redevelopment 
There are multiple stakeholders involved in the process of brownfield redevelopment, 
including local residents, developers, the city, and the presumed society at large.  They 
may have different objectives and motivations, which sometimes are in conflict.  One of 
the usual cases is that community groups often want to transform a brownfield into open 
space, while the city intends to focus on generating jobs and revenues through 
development projects (Greenberg and Lewis 2000).   
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Developers 
Stated in a simple way, the motivation for private developers1 is to make money from 
development projects, though in rare cases some private developers may be involved in 
projects for the pure purpose of public benefits.  The basic evaluation principle for 
developers is that a project must have a reasonable likelihood of making profits.  
Development has uncertainties and risks, otherwise developers cannot make higher 
returns than safe investments, such as treasury bonds.  Developers take the risks and 
are rewarded with high returns.  Brownfield redevelopment involves more uncertainties 
than general development projects so that it requires higher returns.  It also depends on 
the expertise of individual developers.  Some developers have a better understanding 
and control of environmental and legal issues in brownfield redevelopment.  So they 
can reduce the costs of capital and have better chances to win the projects. 
Developers usually perform feasibility studies before making investment decisions.  
They first obtain the market information in the delivery period (development completion), 
such as the forecasted rent and vacancy rate for a certain final use in the same location 
as the brownfield.  Based on the estimation of construction costs and debt financing 
cost, they derive projected levered internal rate of return (IRR) and net present value 
(NPV).  If the IRR is larger than the threshold (the required return) or NPV is equal to or 
larger than zero, they will usually start the development project.  Compared to 
conventional development projects, brownfield redevelopers are confronted with some 
unique issues.  On the benefit side, they often can build on existing infrastructure, gain 
                                                        
1 It is noted that this study only refers to private for-profit developers, sometime using developers interchangeable. I does not 
consider mission-oriented or non-profits developers, such as Community Development Corporations (CDC). 
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zoning variances, and receive government subsidies.  On the cost/risk side, they are 
exposed to extra remediation costs, compliance costs, liability concerns, and protracted 
timing.  Developers also consider other non-financial factors, such as the marketability 
of the property due to a polluted stigma, and the support from community and politicians 
(Wernstedt et al. 2004).  Developers will carefully factor these unique issues into 
feasibility studies. 
Developers do not take public benefits into consideration when they make investment 
decisions.  Although a brownfield redevelopment may bring great benefits to the city, 
local residents, or the society, without a positive NPV, developers may not get involved.  
Many scholars and policy makers advocate a public-private partnership, which tries to 
align the public and private interests (Battle, 2003).   
City 
The city where a brownfield is located will benefit from brownfield redevelopment.  It 
transforms a vacant land and eyesore into a revenue- and job-generating property.   
First, the city gains property tax from the redeveloped site.  Generally speaking, 
brownfields do not have active uses and contribute zero property tax.  Second, the 
cleanup and redevelopment creates short-term employment and redeveloped 
commercial or industrial uses bring long-term jobs.  Finally, the redevelopment and final 
uses create expenditure and other incomes for the city.  Most cities prefer to redevelop 
the brownfield into a commercial or industrial use, which produces the highest tax 
revenue and job growth.  A proposal of redevelopment with final use for public parks is 
definitely in conflict with the city’s interests in obtaining revenues (Greenberg and Lewis 
2000). 
 19
Local Residents 
Local residents usually benefit directly from brownfield cleanup and redevelopment.  
Removing residual pollutants reduces the health risks.  Redevelopment of a vacant site 
into a vibrant use increases the aesthetic value of the neighborhood, which potentially 
increases their house prices and reduces crime rates.  However, a redevelopment 
project may create negative impacts on the neighborhood, especially for commercial and 
industrial uses.  These activities may create traffic, noise, and tax-rate increases.  In 
many cases, residents prefer green space and recreational uses to commercial uses, 
which is in conflict with the city’s interests (Greenberg and Lewis 2000). 
Society 
Although no such interest groups exist in the real world, I presume that the society 
represents the aggregate benefits of every person in a country.  From the social 
perspective, job creation and tax growth may be no more than the transfer from a place 
to another.  Environmental and health benefits, such as saving of green spaces and 
reducing cancer-incidence rate, are the major benefits from brownfield redevelopment.  
Federal financial resources should be used with the goal of maximizing the social 
benefits. 
All in all, developers, local residents, and the society may have different goals for 
brownfield redevelopment.  Developers focus on the private profits from the 
redevelopment.  The city targets job creation and tax revenue growth.  Local residents 
pay attention to the health benefits and neighborhood improvement.  In this study, I 
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focus on social perspective to examine the effectiveness of federal brownfield funding 
programs.  The goal from the social perspective is to maximize the social benefits 
through the incentives.  In this study, I only consider financial factors for developers to 
make decisions on brownfield redevelopment.  I acknowledge non-economic factors 
that impact developers’ decisions, such as liability mitigation and the support from the 
community and local politicians.  I assume that the federal government has limited 
funding sources for brownfield remediation and redevelopment, so it intends to prioritize 
funding towards the projects with the maximum social return (IRR).  
 
2.2 Special Costs for Brownfield Redevelopment 
Compared to greenfield projects, brownfield developers will have to spend extra money 
on site assessment, remediation, and other types of redevelopment efforts.  Some 
costs can be observed directly, while other (indirect) costs are hidden in the pro-forma.  
Direct costs are well documented in various literature, but indirect costs are often 
overlooked by researchers and regulators. 
2.2.1 Direct Costs 
Site Assessment.  Developers need to understand the level of pollution and the cost 
and time of remediation through site assessment before making the development 
decision.  In Phase One assessment, they review public records, physical surroundings, 
and other readily available data for the site; if needed, they will perform a detailed site 
assessment (Phase two assessment), such as environmental engineering investigation, 
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sampling, and chemical analysis of the site (McCarthy 2001).  Assessment costs range 
from $20,000 to $500,000 (or more), depending on lot size, data availability, level of 
pollution, site history, clean-up requirements, etc.  It is difficult to differentiate the 
assessment cost premium for brownfields, compared to other conventional development 
projects. 
Environmental Remediation.  Brownfield analysts categorize remediation costs into 
one-time, ongoing operation and maintenance of remediation efforts and remedies, 
coordination and processing of remediation plan, and application and follow-up with 
regulatory parties (Simon 1998).  Remediation costs depend upon the required 
clean-up levels, which are defined by risk-based cleanup standards.  The standards 
consider site conditions (types of soils and water table) and the site’s end use (Simon 
1998).  Site conditions determine the travel potentials of pollutants, while end uses 
decide human health impacts.  Generally speaking, residential uses require stringent 
standards, while industrial uses may have relatively loose cleanup requirements, 
considering the potential environmental risks.  
Environmental Remediation Insurance.  During brownfield cleanup and redevelopment, 
developers may be faced with unforeseeable costs and law suits from other parties.  
Developers generally purchase environmental remediation insurance to insure against 
the environmental risks in brownfield redevelopment.  There are two forms of 
environmental insurance available for remediation, cost-cap coverage and pollution legal 
liability.  Cost-cap insurance (stop-loss coverage) makes sure that the remediation cost 
over a certain level will be covered by insurance companies.  Pollution legal liability 
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protects the property owner against liabilities to third parties for off-site injury, property 
damage, and remediation costs caused by migrating contamination.  The typical costs 
for pollution legal liability coverage for a seven-year term would be 2 percent of project 
cost. (Simons 1998; McCarthy 2001) 
2.2.2 Indirect Costs 
Financing Premiums.  In addition to specific costs mentioned above, the typical 
financing costs for brownfield redevelopment may be higher than conventional 
development projects.  According to the Northeast-Midwest Institute’s report, 
“Financing Strategies for Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment” (2003), the financing 
premiums for brownfields are reflected in three ways: (1) Lenders tend to require 
borrowers to put at least 25 percent of equity to safeguard lenders’ positions.  The 
higher equity percentage means higher costs for the projects, because the cost of equity 
is generally higher than that of debt.  (2) Debt and equity investors may require higher 
returns.  The report shows that the brownfield premium for equity is 10 to 20 percent 
and for debt is around 2 to 3 percent.  (3) The underwriting costs for brownfield projects 
are higher.  Lenders may require further analyses on environmental data and the 
collateral value. (Bartsch and Wells 2003)  
Legal Fees.  Due to the complicated liability issues involved in brownfield 
redevelopment, developers generally pay higher legal fees than those for conventional 
development projects.  For example, developers need to pay for filing legal documents 
to comply with various regulations on brownfields.  
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Extended Development Period.  In order to perform extra environmental/legal due 
diligence and environmental remediation, developers may spend more time on 
brownfield redevelopment than other greenfield projects, which makes projects more 
time-consuming and usually more expensive.  First, the prolonged timing means lower 
returns, even with the same costs and revenues.  For example, a real estate 
development project incurs the cost of $120M in year 1 and gains revenues plus sales of 
the projects of $150M in year 2.  The project-level IRR is 25%.  If the cost of $120M is 
divided into 2 periods, all other things being equal, the project-level IRR would be 16%.  
Second, the extra time also reflects more equity developers have to put in brownfield 
projects.  Developers would have less time to work on other projects if they spend more 
time on the legal and environmental process of brownfields.  Last, but not least, in the 
development industry, timing is very important.  Developers may lose a project or incur 
great economic losses if they are late in bringing their product to the market. 
 
2.3 Federal, State, and Local Brownfield Financing Programs 
Realizing the difficult economic situation for brownfield redevelopment, many brownfield 
financing programs have been established in the United States to lower the financial 
barrier.  There are numerous financing tools available at federal, state, and local levels 
for brownfield redevelopment in different development phases, ranging from site 
preparation, planning, site assessment, cleanup, to construction (Table 2-1).   Different 
types of financing programs have been designed, such as loans, grants, and insurance.  
Federal and state agencies provide low-or-no-interest loans for brownfield assessment 
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and cleanup efforts.  Grants are available for brownfield assessment and remediation.  
Cities sometimes provide guarantees for cleanup costs overrun so that developers can 
secure debts or lower the interest payments.  Based on my literature review, most of 
current financing programs only target the direct costs, i.e., assessment and remediation 
costs, though some programs are designed to alleviate debt-financing costs.   
Table 2-1: Summary of Brownfield Financing Programs 
Agency Program Uses Eligible Entities
Site Assessment Grants Assessment
Revolving Loan Grant Remediation
Cleanup Grants Remediation
HUD BEDI Remediation
EDA Public Works and EconomicDevelopment Programs Remediation
Treasury Tax Incentives Tax Deduction Developers
Tax Incremental Financing
Assessment,
remediation,planning, site
preparation
Developers
GO Bonds Site acquisition,remediation, infrastructure Local governments
State and local
government
agencies
EPA
States or Cities
Source: Bartsch and Wells, 2003. Financing Strategies for Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment.  
Washington DC: Northeast-Midwest Institute. 
 
2.3.1 Federal Programs   
EPA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) are two major 
funding sources at the federal level.  Brownfield developers sometimes can tap other 
federal funding sources if it conforms to their criteria, with the target issues such as 
economic development, housing, and job creation.  
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Assessment and Cleanup Programs.   Four 
EPA financing programs have been used to promote brownfield redevelopment since 
1995, including assessment grants, revolving loan fund grants, cleanup grants, and job 
training grants.  (1) Site-assessment demonstration pilot programs provide grants of up 
to $250,000 over two years per site for assessing sites and designing clean-up and 
redevelopment models.  (2) Brownfields cleanup revolving loan fund (BCRLF) 
programs provide low-or-no-interest loans of up to $1,000,000 over five years for the 
cleanup.  (3) Site cleanup grants, started in FY 2003, can be used to clean up 
brownfields conducted by cities, development agencies, and nonprofit groups at sites 
that they own.  (4) Job-training pilot programs furnish grants of up to $20,000 over two 
year for training residents of impacted areas for future employment in environmental field.  
In 2003, EPA announced $73 million in grants: 117 Assessment Grants, 28 Revolving 
Loan Fund Grants, 10 Job Training Grants, and 69 Cleanup Grants.  EPA funds 
generally are not directly awarded to individual developers, but rather they are given to 
local government agencies or NGOs.  EPA considers the following factors when making 
funding decisions: ownership status, size, access, districts, public benefits, cost, and 
contamination. (Source: http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/pilot.htm) 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Brownfield Economic 
Development Initiative (BEDI) program.  HUD recognizes that brownfields are one of 
the major obstacles for economic and community development.  Section 108 provides 
financing to local governments for property acquisition, rehabilitation, construction, site 
improvement, and other development activities.  The BEDI program is designed to 
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assist cities in the redevelopment of abandoned and underutilized sites so as to increase 
the tax base and create jobs.  BEDI funds must be used in conjunction with a new 
Section 108-guranteed loan commitment by providing funds for land write-down, 
remediation, fund reserves, direct enhancement for Section 108 loans, etc.  HUD 
awarded $25 million grants and loan guarantees to brownfield projects in 2003. (Source: 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/economicdevelopment/programs/bedi/index.cfm) 
Economic Development Administration Programs (EDA).  EDA has allocated 20 
percent of its funds, about $35 million a year, on brownfield related activities.  EDA’s 
Public Works and Economic Development Programs is the major source of funds for 
brownfield redevelopment.  The funding can be used for infrastructure enhancement, 
i.e., remediation costs specifically for brownfields.  EDA funding is larger ($900,000 on 
average) and more flexible in terms of purposes than other sources.  However, to be 
eligible for this funding, the communities must meet the target unemployment rates. 
(Bartsch and Wells, 2003) 
U.S. Treasury Brownfield Tax Incentives.  Brownfield tax incentives were originally 
signed into law in August 1997, the Taxpayer Relief Act (Public Law 105-34) to “spur the 
cleanup and redevelopment of brownfields in distressed urban and rural areas” (EPA 
2004).  The U.S. Taxpayer Relief Act 2000 prescribes that environmental cleanup costs 
are fully deductible in the year they are incurred, rather than capitalized.  According to 
the EPA Brownfield website, approximately $300 million of remediation costs in 8,000 
brownfields are waived annually, and the tax incentive leverages $3.4 billion in private 
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investment.  To be eligible for tax waiver, brownfields must be located in certain areas. 
(Source: http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/bftaxinc.htm) 
2.3.2 State and Local Programs   
Tax Incremental Financing (TIF).  TIF districts were originally established to redevelop 
the blighted or distressed areas by States or cities.  Redevelopment authorities issue 
bonds to finance redevelopment costs upfront, and then use increased property or sales 
taxes to repay the bonds.  TIF allows cities to initiate revitalization in distressed areas 
and does not require public funds.  It may pay for new infrastructure, planning expenses, 
demolition, site assessment, and cleanup costs.  However, TIF is criticized for that it 
lacks of evidence that the redevelopment would not happen without TIF (Simons 1998).   
Tax Incentives.  States often offer tax abatements or tax credits to allow developers to 
use projects’ revenues for financing brownfield-related costs, such as remediation.   
General obligation (GO) bonds.  States, towns, cities, and other municipal authorities 
can issue municipal securities backed or secured by taxes.  GO bonds are a major 
source of funds for infrastructure and redevelopment projects.  Local governments can 
use GO bonds for site acquisition, remediation, and infrastructure enhancement.  Unlike 
TIF, GO bonds will be counted against a jurisdiction’s debt caps (Bartsch and Wells 
2003).   
Besides tax incentives and GO bonds, some States provide revolving loans, grants, 
technical assistance, and environmental insurance for brownfield assessment and 
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remediation.  Cities often provide zoning relief for brownfield projects to encourage 
redevelopment. 
 
2.4 Pros and Cons of the Current U.S. Brownfield Financing Programs 
Federal and State brownfield financing programs have provided financial assistance for 
brownfield cleanup and redevelopment and promoted economic development and 
environmental quality in the United States.  Without financing programs, many 
brownfield projects will not happen, due to financial difficulties.  Based on my review of 
current financing programs, I summarize their pros and cons below.  
2.4.1 Pros of Current Brownfield Financing Programs 
Making Decision Locally.  Most federal brownfield financing programs are awarded to 
local governments or agencies, rather than individual developers.  States or 
municipalities are more familiar with local situations than the federal government and 
have a better understanding of local priorities.  It has an advantage that the money can 
be used wisely by allowing localities to make decisions on allocating brownfield funding.   
Taking Costs into Consideration.  When considering the remediation and assessment 
loans/grants, the administrating agencies often take into account of site size, the level 
and types of pollution, and other cost related information.   This ensures that the 
funding is allocated based on the needs.  
Removing the Perceived Risks.  Lack of understanding of environmental risks is the 
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major obstacle for brownfield redevelopment.  More and more cities provide grants or 
forgivable loans for site assessment and make the assessment information available to 
potential developers.  They make developers informed of the costs and the time for 
cleanup.  
Reducing Debt Financing Costs.  Cities also recognize the indirect costs of brownfield 
redevelopment by reducing developers’ costs of debt financing costs and offering tax 
abatement.  Many cities provide low or no interest loans for remediation costs and offer 
tax breaks in certain periods. 
2.4.2 Cons of Current Brownfield Financing Programs 
Failure to Consider the Full Costs.  Currently most financing programs target direct 
costs of brownfield cleanup and redevelopment, i.e., assessment and remediation costs.  
Although some programs relieve the costs of debt financing, no financing programs take 
account of the full indirect costs of a brownfield project.  For some projects, indirect 
costs may account for a larger percentage than direct costs.   
No Consistent and Quantitative Funding Allocation Criteria.  Most funding decisions are 
made locally by States or cities.  No consistent and quantitative criteria have been 
established to evaluate the brownfield projects and allocate the funding.  There are 
generally more than 20 brownfield financing programs for which a developer can apply.  
The financial resources for brownfield are scarce and scattered in different entities.  
Developers experience difficulties in tapping these resources.  Based on my 
conversations with selected developers, they would rather not take the time to go 
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through the long process for a small chance to get a small amount of money.  Local 
governments could streamline the process by integrating all the brownfield financing 
programs into one or two agencies.   
No Quantitative Measurement Public Benefits of Brownfield Redevelopment.  Although 
many agency reports document the public benefits of brownfield redevelopment, they do 
not take into account public benefits, or, at least not quantitatively measure them when 
making funding decisions.  Because of the limited funding sources, the financial 
resources should be allocated to the projects contributing the largest benefits to the 
society. 
To sum up, current brownfield financing programs cannot cover the full extra costs of 
remediation and redevelopment.  They are designed to remove uncertainties and lower 
the financial burdens for brownfield developers.  The funding decision considers the 
actual costs and some indirect costs.  Brownfield funding would be used more efficiently 
if it can develop a way to measure public benefits and streamline the application 
process.  
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 Chapter 3 
Optimal Brownfield Incentives 
 
Brownfield redevelopment is basically an externality problem and requires government 
intervention.  In this chapter, I begin with theoretical analyses and explore the optimal 
incentives for brownfield redevelopment.  Based on the theoretical analyses, I provide a 
research hypothesis, methodologies, and data.  
 
3.1 Theoretical Analyses – Optimal Government Intervention  
The theoretical foundation for brownfield financing is externality and market failure.    
3.1.1 Externality and Market Failure2
An externality is defined as “occurs when a decision causes costs or benefits to 
stakeholders other than the decision maker”, but “the decision maker does not bear all of 
the costs or reap all the gains from his or her action” (Wikipedia).  There are two types 
of externalities, i.e. positive and negative externalities.  Pollution is a typical example of 
negative externality, which creates external costs to other stakeholders (e.g. health 
problems and pollution abatement costs), but the polluter may not compensate the costs 
                                                        
2 3.1.1 is adapted from Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Externality 
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to the impacted stakeholders.  The full cost to the society is larger than the cost to 
producers/polluters, due to the additional “external costs”.  Goods with negative 
externalities, if without government intervention, will be overproduced/over-consumed 
from the society’s point of view.  Education is a typical kind of goods with positive 
externalities.  It brings more benefits to the society than the tuitions.  Goods with 
positive externalities, if without government intervention, will be under-produced or 
under-consumed from society’s point of view. (Wikipedia) 
When there are needs for real estate, a developer may face the choices of developing 
either a greenfield or a brownfield.  From the social perspective, for greenfield 
development, developers take natural habitats or agricultural lands, which otherwise can 
provide environmental benefits to the society, such as bio-diversity, clean air, and 
pollution abatement.  Greenfield development, as a kind of goods with negative 
externalities, would be over produced without appropriate government intervention.  
Brownfield redevelopment not only saves greenfields, but it also provides other social 
benefits, such as environmental and health benefits for communities.  If these external 
benefits are not subsidized by the government, brownfield redevelopment would be 
under produced.  
From the perspective of the society or welfare economics, both kinds of externalities will 
lead to the economy deflecting from the socially optimal status, i.e., incurring a market 
failure.  In greenfield development, due to the underestimated costs (external costs), 
the market price (P0) is lower and the quantity (Q0) is higher than the optimal levels 
(Figure 3.1).  In brownfield redevelopment, due to underestimated utilities (external 
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benefits), the market price (P0) is higher and the quantity (Q0) is lower than the optimal 
levels (Figure 3.2). (Wikipedia) 
To correct for market failures, there are usually two types of solutions, i.e. private 
negotiation and public intervention.  Ronald Coase argued that individuals could settle 
agreements through negotiations.  For example, the producers of external benefits can 
bargain with the beneficiaries (the recipients of external benefits) and receive 
compensations from them.  However, the Coase Theorem is contingent upon the 
following conditions: “(1) property rights are well defined; (2) people act rationally; (3) 
transaction costs are minimal” (Coase 1960; Wikipedia).  In brownfield or greenfield 
development, it is evident that these conditions are not satisfied.  For example, it is very 
difficult to identify who receive the benefits of brownfield redevelopment.  Also, the 
transaction costs for negotiating with the beneficiaries and collecting the payments are 
very high.  Governmental intervention can take several forms: tax, subsidies, and 
quantity control.   For goods with negative externalities, such as greenfield 
development, the government can charge a pollution/resource tax (PS – P0) on the 
producer, thus the supply curve shifts up by PS – P0.  The new equilibrium will be equal 
to the socially optimal status.   Alternatively, government can identify the optimal 
quantity QS and set the quota at QS (figure 3.1).   For goods of positive externalities, 
such as brownfield redevelopment, governments can subsidize the producer by PS – P0 
and shift the supply curve down by PS – P0.  The new equilibrium reaches the socially 
optimal status.   Similar to the previous situation, quantity control can lead to the same 
effect (Figure 3.2).  
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Government intervention has its own problems and may result in government failure.  
On the one hand, it is very hard to calculate the optimal tax, subsidy, and quota, because 
the external benefits or costs cannot be observed in the market and are thus difficult to 
quantify.  On the other hand, it may cause economic inefficiency by public policy, such 
as rent-seeking and shortsightedness effect.  
(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_failure) 
Brownfield redevelopment contributes to the society with many benefits without being 
compensated (positive externality).  Brownfield redevelopment would be undersupplied 
without government intervention.  Fortunately, many brownfield financing programs 
have provided subsidies, thus increased the supply of redevelopment.  Theoretically, if 
these subsidies are equal to the external benefits the brownfield redevelopment creates, 
they are successful in correcting market failure.   
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 Figure 3.2: Brownfield Redevelopment  
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3.1.2 An Optimal Funding Allocation Mechanism 
In the real world, the government does not have the financial resources to subsidize all 
the positive externality.  I design a brownfield funding-decision flow chart, which 
maximizes the social returns within the public-funding limit (Figure 3.3).  First, if a 
brownfield project has a positive or zero private net present value (NPV), governments 
should not fund it.  Many brownfield redevelopment projects have been funded by 
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developers themselves without public funding.  Second, if the private NPV is negative, 
we can calculate the amount of subsidies to make private NPV zero.  Based on the 
amount of subsidies (investment costs) and public benefits (revenues) from a brownfield 
project, the net present social value (NPSV) can be derived.  If a project’s NPSV is 
negative, governments should not fund the project.  If a project’s NPSV is larger or 
equal to zero, governments should consider its funding application.  Finally, if the 
available funding is less than the required amount based on a social NPV analysis, then 
the funding allocation should give priorities to those projects with larger NPSVs.  
Figure 3.3: Proposed Optimal Brownfield Funding Decision-Flow Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: the author. 
NOTE: NPV (PUBLIC) IS SAME AS NPSV (NET PRESENT SOCIAL VALUE). 
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3.2 Research Hypothesis 
In this study, I examine if the brownfield funding is allocated in a way to correct market 
failure, based on the optimal framework that I proposes in Figure 3.3.  Given the 
limitation of available brownfield funding, the funding should be allocated to the projects 
that both need public money and generate the maximum public benefits.  Due to 
confidentiality, private NPV (the first step in the flow chart) and/or the subsidy to make 
private NPV zero are difficult to obtain.  And I do not have sufficient data to test if funded 
projects have larger NPSVs than not-funded projects.  I can only investigate if NPSVs of 
funded brownfield projects are positive.  
My research hypothesis is that current brownfield incentives are sub-optimal: the funding 
decision does not consider NPSV so that some funds are allocated to projects with 
negative NPSVs.  
 
3.3 Methodologies 
I use case studies and benefit-cost analysis to test my hypothesis.  I test whether the 
NPSVs of selected cases are negative. 
Case Studies 
To support my hypothesis, I select three brownfield cases in Massachusetts to examine 
the effectiveness of brownfield incentives.  I also obtain further background information 
from local planning agencies in the three towns.  By examining the social returns of 
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three brownfield redevelopment cases, I intend to test my hypothesis.  
Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Benefit-costs analysis is often used to evaluate the public projects.  In this study, I 
modify it to evaluate the public benefits and costs of brownfield projects from a social 
perspective.   
To quantify the social return of a brownfield project, I use DCF (Discounted Cash Flow) 
analysis.  I calculate the NPSV and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of brownfield projects, 
based on the cash flow of social benefits and costs (Brealey and Myers, 2006).  The 
government should not sponsor negative NPSV projects and should prefer projects with 
larger NPSVs.  Also, the government should not subsidize the projects with IRRs 
smaller than its “opportunity cost of capital”. 
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3.4 Measuring Social Investment Costs and Benefits of Brownfield projects 
In social benefit-cost analyses, the key step is to identify and measure public benefits 
and public investments (public costs) of brownfield projects.   
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3.4.1 Rationale of Selecting Benefits and Costs 
The benefits of brownfield redevelopment covered in various literature encompass the 
increase of tax revenues, job growth, environmental and health benefits, efficient use of 
existing infrastructure, transportation, etc.  The purpose of this study is to identify those 
social benefits and costs that are not reflected in the free market and so entail 
government intervention by generating incentives.  Hence, I intentionally exclude some 
benefits and costs associated with brownfield redevelopment that are either not valid in 
social perspective or already internalized.  For example, a tax-base increase and job 
creation are benefits to the community, but greenfield projects could produce similar 
benefits.  They are no more than a transfer of benefits from one place to another. 
Considering that some benefits are controversial, I focus my benefit-cost analysis on 
easily identified benefits and costs. 
3.4.2 Measuring Public Costs of Brownfield Redevelopment  
In theory, the social investment costs of brownfield redevelopment should be the 
minimum amount of funding to make the private NPV equal to zero.  In the real world, 
governments allocate the funding based on the direct costs of brownfield redevelopment, 
which may differ from the optimal level of funding.   
The real public costs of a brownfield project are comprised of two parts: various sources 
of public funds that a brownfield project received and the social costs of the redeveloped 
property.  The first one is straightforward and easy to measure.  A redeveloped 
property may increase the demand for infrastructure and create traffic, noises, and new 
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environmental problems.  Considering the complexity of measuring the second part of 
costs, I only derive public costs of a brownfield project by adding the public funds 
invested in the project. 
3.4.3 Measuring Public Benefits of Brownfield Redevelopment 
Benefits are relatively controversial and difficult to measure, because many of them 
cannot be directly observed in the market.  In this study, I use hedonic models to 
measure the public benefits of brownfield redevelopment and focus on local residents’ 
benefits.   
3.4.3.1 Composition of Public Benefits 
Brownfield redevelopment returns to the society with green space conservation, health 
and environmental benefits, and control of urban sprawl.  
Green Space Conservation 
Brownfield redevelopment mitigates the development pressure on greenfields and 
preserves agricultural and natural habitats.  One acre of a reclaimed brownfield saves 
4.5 acres of green space (White House Council on Environmental Quality 2004).  The 
monetary values of green space saving may be of different values at different locations, 
based upon the willingness-to-pay for green space.  Analysts generally use contingent 
valuation (CV) to measure the willingness to pay for environmental goods.    
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Health Benefits 
Remediation/redevelopment reduces health risks posed by contaminants to the 
community and the workers in the impact region.  An analyst can measure the health 
benefits, using either the real costs of health risks or the costs of clean-up (Hamilton and 
Viscusi 1999).  The first method is ideal, but it is scientifically controversial to translate 
environmental risks to the number of deaths or diseases averted; and ethically 
controversial to translate the averted health risks into monetary values.  The 
remediation cost data are easier to identify, but the costs can not reflect the real 
environmental and health risks.   
Other Benefits 
Brownfield redevelopment encourages compact urban development and controls urban 
sprawl.  It can reduce commuting costs, including the direct cost of commuting and the 
externality associated with travel (e.g. congestion, emission, noise, safety, and accidents) 
(Sousa 2002).    
3.4.3.2 Alternative Categorization of Benefits and Measurement 
It is difficult and time-consuming to calculate the various public benefits illustrated above.  
In this study, I employ an alternative way to categorize and measure public benefits.  
Based on the recipients, I categorize the public benefits of brownfield redevelopment into 
three types, i.e., the benefits for local residents, local business, and the general public.  
Local residents benefit from improved views and environmental and health risks 
reduction.  Local businesses gain the increased revenues and their employees enjoy 
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health and aesthetic benefits from brownfield redevelopment.  The general public 
receives the benefits from green-space saving. 
Local residents’ benefits can be observed from the neighborhood housing appreciation, 
because local residents would like to pay more for improved neighborhood due to 
brownfield redevelopment.  I use hedonic models to measure the housing-price 
appreciation associated with brownfield redevelopment. 
Local businesses’ benefits can be calculated in a similar way, but the hedonic model 
should build on commercial properties to reflect increased revenues and on wages to 
reflect increased attractiveness of working place.  Due to data constraints, I do not 
include these benefits. 
The general public’s benefits can be measured by contingent valuation (CV), which 
builds on the survey and questionnaires to estimate people’s willingness to pay.  I do 
not include CV, because of the limitation of resources. 
To sum up, I include all the public brownfield funds, such as tax credits, grants, low or no 
interest loans, etc., in social investment costs.  These funds can be seen as the public 
investment on brownfield redevelopment.  I only take into account the local residents’ 
benefits in public benefits, due to the constraints of data and resources.  I intentionally 
exclude some benefits associated with brownfield redevelopment that do not exist from 
the social perspective, such as tax and job creation.  
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3.5 Hedonic Model 
In this study, as noted earlier, I use hedonic models to measure neighborhood housing 
price appreciation due to brownfield redevelopment, which represents local residents’ 
benefits from brownfield cleanup and redevelopment.  The social benefit-cost analysis 
is the core part of this study, and the measurement of public benefits is the key of the 
benefit-cost analysis.  Hence, I detail the hedonic model methodology and steps in a 
separate part.  
3.5.1 The Principles of Using Hedonic Model 
Many scholars use the hedonic model to identify the distance-related effects of 
hazardous sites on housing prices (e.g. Kiel and Zabel 2001).  Housing prices can be 
estimated by structural, neighborhood characteristics, inflation and other factors.  By 
controlling all the independent variables except for the variable of distance to a 
brownfield, I can measure the price appreciation due to brownfield cleanup and 
redevelopment.   
I measure the housing-price appreciation associated with brownfield cleanup and 
redevelopment as the discounted value of future environmental, aesthetic, and health 
benefits.  Local residents factor the annual costs, such as health risks, aesthetic 
disamenity, and environmental risks, by discounting them into present values when they 
evaluate a house purchase close to a brownfield.  My hypothesis is that a brownfield 
has negative impacts on local residents so that the price-distance slope is positive, 
reflecting the local resident’s willingness to pay for living farther away from the brownfield, 
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and brownfield redevelopment will lower the price-distance slope, because it provides 
local residents with health, environmental, and aesthetic benefits (or reduction of health, 
environmental, aesthetic costs). . 
3.5.2 Data Sources 
I will use the following data for completing the case studies: (1) Sale transaction data.  
The Warren Group (2006) provides single-family house sale transaction data, which 
include the addresses of houses, sale prices, year of built, year of sold, number of 
bathroom and bedroom, living area, lot size, property tax, and types of structure.  I do 
not include neighborhood characteristics, because the research areas I delineate are 
generally within a 0.5-mile radius.  I assume that neighborhood characteristics are 
homogenous in the area.  (2) Map of the impact area for each brownfield.  Based on 
the address of a brownfield, I identify the impact region (study area).  From my 
interviews with residents and urban planners in the area, I have found that a 0.5 to 1 mile 
radius generally covers the impact area.  (3) The years that brownfields are abandoned, 
remediated, and redeveloped.  These dates are vintage years for the impacts of 
housing values, and I use them to identify the time range to match available 
sales-transaction data.  (4) General background information on the brownfield sites and 
neighborhoods.  Background information includes aerial photos, site history, 
redevelopment project background, census data, etc.  I use all the information to help 
understand the neighborhood and impacts of cleanup and redevelopment.  
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3.5.3 Model Specification 
The hedonic model depicts the relationship between property values and housing 
characteristics, as expressed in the following formula: 
Ln (Price) = f (X1i, X2i, …, Xni)  ……………………………………. (3.1)  
where Ln(Price) is the natural logarithm of the sale price of the house and X series 
variables are explanatory variables representing housing characteristics.  They include 
structural variables, inflation index, and distance variables.  Below is a list of 
independent variables used for hedonic models.  
distance: distance from transaction address to the brownfield in meters; 
dist_sq: the square of distance to brownfield;  
Lotsize: lot size in 1000 sq feet;  
Liv_sf: living area in 1000 sq feet; 
bedroom: number of bedrooms; 
bathroom: number of bath rooms; 
age: age of house in years; 
style_X: dummy variables for house styles, such as Cape Cod, colonial, ranch, raised 
ranch, garrison and bungalow; 
sold_year: dummy variables for the different years that the house was sold. 
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3.5.4 The Process of Model Building 
I conduct the basic process of hedonic model building in four steps. 
Step1: Data Collection 
First, I interview urban planners, visit the site, and obtain related 
redevelopment/remediation data.  I obtain housing sale transaction data within the 
impact region ranging from 3-5 years before remediation announcement date to 3-5 
years after redevelopment completion date, provided by The Warren Group.  In this 
study, I focus on the neighborhood with a high concentration of single-families, which 
makes the models easier to build.   
Step2: Data Clean and Preliminary Analysis 
The second step is to prepare for regression analyses, including eliminating outliers, 
calculating the distances, examining the distribution of each variable, and deciding the 
formats of the variable (original or dummy, linear or quadratic).   
I calculate Age by subtracting the year built from the year sold.  I transform year sold 
into a category variable, reflecting annual housing-price inflation in the area.  When I 
transform Styles into category variables, I exclude the category with the largest number 
of observations.   
I select the data period to cover a span from at least 3 years before remediation or 
immediately after abandon year to 3 years after remediation.  My purpose is to 
accumulate enough data to capture price impacts.  I use ArcGIS to calculate the 
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distances from single-family houses in the impact region to the brownfield.  First, I 
geocode all the house addresses by U.S. Streetmap, and then use proximity analysis in 
ArcGIS software to calculate the straight-line distances between each house to the 
brownfield.  
I also use ArcGIS, US Street Map, and image files to analyze the topography and 
determine the appropriate impact region, which I designate by a certain radius from the 
brownfield site.  To simplify the model, I usually select housing transaction data in the 
same town as the brownfield in order to save the neighborhood variables.  By 
considering local residents’ perception of environmental risks, topography, and 
transportation convenience, I determine a radius for each case.  For example, I do not 
consider housing transactions isolated from a brownfield by natural/artificial barriers, 
such as lakes, mountains, railroads, and highways.  Generally speaking, more people 
perceive the risks from brownfields with visible pollution, good publicity, and good 
accessibility.  I also use statistical analyses to test the impact region.   
I examine correlations between independent variables to prevent the collinearity problem 
by excluding one of two variables with high correlations.  Besides selecting the 
independent variable, I decide which of the following formats to use for these variables, 
linear or quadratic, and dummy or quantitative variable.  For example, the relationship 
between lot size and natural logarithm of the price is better depicted in quadratic rather 
than linear form.  In this case, I need to add both lot size and the square of lot size in the 
formula.  
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Outliers could be recording errors and non arm-length transactions.  I examine the 
distribution of sale price and exclude non arm-length transactions.  I develop other 
simple rules to avoid recording errors, such as filtering the data of negative ages 
(generally recording errors of years built).  
Step 3: Data Analyses 
I conduct regression analyses separately before the remediation and after 
redevelopment completion.  I perform two additional regressions to (1) test whether the 
brownfield has negative housing price impact before remediation; (2) test the hypothesis 
that brownfield cleanup and redevelopment have significant positive impacts on housing 
prices; and (3) calculate the housing-price improvements due to brownfield 
redevelopment. 
Step 4: Result Interpretation   
The slope before remediation should be positive.  The slope reflects the local residents’ 
willingness-to-pay for living farther away from the undesirable site (brownfields).  I 
assume that the difference of distance gradients is attributed to brownfield 
redevelopment’s impacts on housing price.  Theoretically, the price-distance slope 
before remediation is steeper than that before remediation.  And the difference between 
the two gradients can be seen as the housing price appreciation due to brownfield 
cleanup and redevelopment. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
An optimal brownfield funding-allocation mechanism should: (1) NOT fund projects with 
private NPV>=0; (2) consider projects with positive NPSV; (3) prefer projects with larger 
positive NPSV.  My research hypothesis is that brownfield funds are allocated to some 
projects with negative NPSV.  I use social benefit-cost analyses to test the hypothesis 
by evaluating three cases studies in Massachusetts.  The social costs are the 
brownfield funds invested in a project.  The public benefits are the benefits to local 
residents, local business, and the general public.  I only consider the first benefits in this 
study and employ hedonic models to measure indirectly local residents’ benefits from 
brownfield redevelopment. 
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 Chapter 4 
Case Studies in Massachusetts 
 
In this chapter, I investigate three brownfield redevelopment cases in Massachusetts, 
selected from successful stories in EPA region 1 website.  I employ hedonic models to 
measure the housing price effect due to brownfield cleanup and redevelopment, which 
reflects local residents’ willingness to pay for the improvement of environmental quality 
and health benefits.  Based on the estimated public benefits, I calculate the return for 
government investment (brownfield funds) and evaluate if the investment is justified by 
the public benefits received. 
 
4.1. Case One: Brockton, MA 
 
Table 4-1: Highlights of Former Shoe Factory Site in Brockton 
Redevelopment End Use corporate headquarters 
Site Location 173 Spark Street, Brockton, MA 02302 
Size 6 Acres 
Pollution Types n/a, typical shoe factory pollutants 
Abandon Date 1994 
Remediation Start Date 2002 
Remediation Finish Date 2002 
Total Government Funds $463,947 
No. of Transaction Data Available 1,830 
 Source: EPA Region 1 Brownfield website.   
 http://www.epa.gov/newengland/brownfields/success/brockton_tba.htm 
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 4.1.1 Site Description 
 
The Brockton brownfield site (Table 4-1 and Figures 4-1 and 4-2) was a redevelopment 
of an abandoned industrial site.  The six-acre site on 173 Park Street had been vacant 
since a former shoe factory burned down in 1994.  According to the City of Brockton, 
the site is located in an “economic corridor” of Brockton, where many other successful 
firms and the Montello commuter rail station are located.  
The city secured Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) assessment funds of $50,025 
to complete environmental assessment Phase 1 in 1997 and Phase 2 in 1999.  The city 
sold the property to Fleet Environmental Services in 1999 and reached an agreement of 
Tax Incremental Financing (TIF) with the new owner.  Fleet transferred the property to 
David Gooding, Inc (DGI) in 2002.  And the city modified the TIF agreement so that DGI 
will receive a property-tax reduction of $321,422 over 13 years and is eligible to claim a 
5% investment tax credit from the State.  In 2004, DGI moved into the new 
60,000-square-feet building as its corporate headquarters and warehouse distribution 
facility after the lot was vacant for ten years.  
(Source: http://www.epa.gov/newengland/brownfields/success/brockton_tba.htm) 
The GIS map shows the location of the brownfield, single-family houses in a one-mile 
radius, streets, highways, and context (Figure 4-1).  The photo and air photo show the 
redeveloped site and its context (Figure 4-2). 
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Figure 4-1: ArcGIS Map of Brockton, One-Mile Radius of the Brownfield Site 
 
Source: ArcGIS, U.S. StreetMap 9.1; Single-family addresses by Warren Group 
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Figure 4-2: Photograph and Air Photograph of the Redeveloped Site in Brockton  
(DGI Headquarters) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the City of Brockton, and Google Earth 2006. 
 
 
4.1.2 Data Set 
The Brockton data set in Brockton incorporates 1830 single-family housing transactions 
within a one-mile radius of the target brownfield site (Figure 4-2), with the sale years 
ranging from 1994 to 2006.  The period covers abandonment, remediation, and 
post-redevelopment phases.  The number of samples is large enough to support 
statistical analyses.  Descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the model are 
shown in Table 4-2.   
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Table 4-2: Descriptive Statistics for the Brownfield in Brockton 
Descriptive Statistics
1830 50,200 540,000 153,987 76,234
1830 201.8 1607.0 1036.7 369.3
1830 40,716 2,582,392 1,211,098 738,928
1830 1 4 1.23 .391
1830 1 6 2.99 .673
1830 2.2 160.3 10.2 8.2
1830 4.7 25696.4 171.0 983.3
1830 0 229 52.55 27.81
1830 0 1 .30 .458
1830 0 1 .10 .297
1830 0 1 .08 .269
1830 0 1 .16 .367
1830 0 0 .00 .000
1830 0 1 .09 .291
1830 0 1 .00 .023
1830 0 1 .07 .256
1830 0 1 .07 .263
1830 0 1 .08 .267
1830 0 1 .08 .270
1830 0 1 .09 .283
1830 0 1 .09 .284
1830 0 1 .08 .274
1830 0 1 .08 .279
1830 0 1 .08 .270
1830 0 1 .09 .290
1830 0 1 .10 .298
1830 0 1 .01 .109
1830
PRICE
DISTANCE
DIST_SQ
BATHROOMS
BEDROOMS
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
AGE
style_colo
style_bngl
style_cape
style_split
style_multiunit
style_rdranch
style_twofam
SOLD_95
SOLD_96
SOLD_97
SOLD_98
SOLD_99
SOLD_00
SOLD_01
SOLD_02
SOLD_03
SOLD_04
SOLD_05
SOLD_06
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
4.1.3 Data Analyses 
The basic procedure of data analyses is illustrated in chapter 3.  Below are the major 
results of data analyses. 
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Price.  To exclude non arm-length transactions, I examine the distribution of the price.  
I set a $50,000 threshold so as to exclude 6% of the smallest prices.  Also, I test the 
excluded prices by using a scatterplot of price and distance.  Most of excluded 
observations are well distributed in the distance range.  
Distance.  I select a one-mile radius to cover the impact region.  I realize that Montello 
commuter rail station is only 0.1 mile away from the brownfield site.  Although the rail 
station has a large impact on housing prices, I do not factor it into the model for two 
reasons.  The distances from the station to the houses are very similar as to the 
brownfield site.  The rail station’s impacts within one mile are assumed to be 
homogenous, i.e., nearly same price impacts within a one-mile radius.  And when 
calculating the difference of price-distance gradients, the effect of commuter rail station 
can be canceled out.  I note that the price-distance slope before remediation may be 
flattened by the positive impacts of the commuter rail station. 
Living area, bathroom, and bedroom.  The Pearson correlation between living area and 
bedroom is 0.493 and is significant at the 0.01 level.  I regress ln(price) on living area 
and bedroom separately.  The number of bedrooms results in a more significant 
coefficient, therefore, I exclude the number of bedrooms.  
Lot size and age.  They basically exhibit a linear form, although the coefficient for the 
square of lot size is significant.   
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4.1.4 Review of Regression Results 
Through independent regressions and collinearity tests, I select independent variables 
and their forms.  I use SPSS to obtain regression results for the entire data set (Table 
4-3).  The regression model achieves a reasonably good result.  The R square 
indicates that 80.6% of variation in ln(price) can be explained by all the independent 
variables listed in Table 4-3.  Most independent variables are statistically significant at 
95% confidence level.   
z Housing price has appreciated by 126% since 1994.  This is in line with the 
revitalization in this region, such as the opening of public schools and commuter rail 
stations and taming crime rates. 
z Having one more bathroom creates a 9.4% of price premium, while one more 
bedroom provides 4.7% of price premium.  
z Houses of ten years older lose an average of 2.13% in price. 
z A lot size of 77,722 square feet provides the largest price premium of 500%, while a 
lot size of 1,000 square feet only furnishes a 6% .price premium. 
z Colonial, Cape Cod, and Raised-Ranch styles houses sell for higher than average 
prices, 5.94%, 9.77%, and 12.1%, respectively.   
z The coefficient for distance is 0.02026% and is significant at the 95% confidence 
interval, which means the average price of houses 100 meters away from the 
brownfield increases by 2.025%, considering the quadratic coefficient.  
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Table 4-3: Regression Results for the Brownfield in Brockton 
 
Model Summary
.899 .809 .806 .218
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
 
Coefficientsa
10.952 .053 204.934 .000
2.026E-04 .000 .151 2.518 .012
-1.03E-07 .000 -.154 -2.561 .011
9.378E-02 .014 .074 6.513 .000
4.717E-02 .009 .064 5.473 .000
5.996E-03 .001 .099 4.445 .000
-3.60E-05 .000 -.072 -3.326 .001
-2.13E-03 .000 -.120 -6.179 .000
5.942E-02 .020 .055 2.938 .003
3.571E-02 .023 .021 1.543 .123
9.772E-02 .022 .053 4.545 .000
2.801E-02 .018 .021 1.595 .111
.121 .021 .071 5.833 .000
-.130 .221 -.006 -.591 .555
1.010E-02 .027 .005 .376 .707
-2.54E-03 .026 -.001 -.096 .923
9.487E-02 .026 .051 3.610 .000
.204 .026 .111 7.786 .000
.328 .026 .188 12.826 .000
.506 .026 .291 19.810 .000
.697 .026 .387 26.840 .000
.853 .026 .480 33.087 .000
1.014 .026 .554 38.671 .000
1.112 .025 .652 43.780 .000
1.192 .025 .718 47.465 .000
1.256 .050 .277 24.957 .000
(Constant)
DISTANCE
DIST_SQ
BATHROOMS
BEDROOMS
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
AGE
style_colo
style_bngl
style_cape
style_split
style_rdranch
style_twofam
SOLD_95
SOLD_96
SOLD_97
SOLD_98
SOLD_99
SOLD_00
SOLD_01
SOLD_02
SOLD_03
SOLD_04
SOLD_05
SOLD_06
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LN_PRICEa. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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 4.1.5 Comparison Between Before and After Remediation Effects 
I perform two additional regressions to (1) test whether the brownfield has negative 
housing price impact before remediation; (2) test the hypothesis that brownfield cleanup 
and redevelopment have significant positive impacts on housing prices; and (3) calculate 
the housing-price improvements due to brownfield redevelopment. 
I split the data set into two data sets, i.e., 1994 to 2001 and 2002 to 2006, which covers 
the pre- and post-remediation periods.  They consist of 1,158 and 623 cases, 
respectively.  For both of the two datasets, I perform regressions by using the same 
variables as for the whole sample.  The first data set captures the housing price before 
remediation, when brownfields should have negative price impacts.  The second one 
reflects housing prices in the post-remediation period.   
The R square results in Tables 4-4 and 4-5, show that the first regression explains 61.4% 
of variation in the natural logarithm of housing prices, and the second one explains 
51.6% of variation.   Both estimates are less precisely than the regression for the whole 
data set.  One explanation may be the smaller number of observations, especially for 
the second dataset.  Another is that the regressions have fewer independent variables 
than other hedonic models.  The estimation errors are magnified in small datasets.  
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Table 4-4: Regression Results for the Brownfield in Brockton, 1994 to 2001 
Model Summary
.788 .620 .614 .205
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
 
Coefficientsa
10.956 .061 178.451 .000
2.216E-04 .000 .249 2.382 .017
-1.05E-07 .000 -.235 -2.241 .025
.105 .017 .125 6.243 .000
2.799E-02 .011 .054 2.659 .008
5.919E-03 .002 .160 3.882 .000
-2.20E-05 .000 -.074 -1.853 .064
-1.57E-03 .000 -.130 -3.660 .000
3.512E-02 .025 .048 1.430 .153
7.896E-03 .029 .007 .276 .782
9.248E-02 .026 .074 3.578 .000
3.428E-02 .020 .040 1.693 .091
.134 .024 .121 5.485 .000
-.122 .209 -.011 -.585 .559
1.260E-02 .025 .012 .499 .618
-3.69E-03 .025 -.004 -.148 .882
9.591E-02 .025 .095 3.876 .000
.205 .025 .207 8.338 .000
.331 .024 .347 13.712 .000
.501 .024 .528 20.771 .000
.697 .024 .711 28.465 .000
(Constant)
DISTANCE
DIST_SQ
BATHROOMS
BEDROOMS
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
AGE
style_colo
style_bngl
style_cape
style_split
style_rdranch
style_twofam
SOLD_95
SOLD_96
SOLD_97
SOLD_98
SOLD_99
SOLD_00
SOLD_01
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LN_PRICEa. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Both of the hypotheses are verified.  The price-distance gradient is positive and 
significant before remediation.  It represents local residents’ willingness to pay for living 
farther away from the site.  The price-distance gradient is positive and significant during 
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Table 4-5: Regression Results for the Brownfield in Brockton, 2002 to 2006 
Model Summary
.727 .529 .516 .134
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
 
Coefficientsa
11.859 .060 196.971 .000
1.870E-04 .000 .357 2.106 .036
-9.81E-08 .000 -.375 -2.209 .028
.100 .016 .203 6.429 .000
2.890E-02 .009 .108 3.284 .001
1.349E-02 .004 .335 3.494 .001
-2.65E-04 .000 -.213 -2.314 .021
-1.81E-03 .000 -.259 -5.280 .000
8.825E-02 .021 .214 4.186 .000
6.279E-02 .024 .102 2.662 .008
7.060E-02 .022 .104 3.176 .002
2.681E-02 .020 .048 1.362 .174
.124 .022 .184 5.614 .000
.140 .016 .298 8.519 .000
.236 .016 .533 14.922 .000
.304 .016 .707 19.466 .000
.325 .031 .311 10.462 .000
(Constant)
DISTANCE
DIST_SQ
BATHROOMS
BEDROOMS
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
AGE
style_colo
style_bngl
style_cape
style_split
style_rdranch
SOLD_03
SOLD_04
SOLD_05
SOLD_06
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LN_PRICEa. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
2002 to 2006, which means the residual negative impacts after remediation.  However, 
the price-distance gradient decreases after remediation.  The difference in the 
price-distance slopes reflects the remediation/redevelopment impacts on housing prices.   
Based on the difference of the slope of price-distance, I calculate the price change for 
each single-family house within the one-mile radius.  I derive house prices in 2003 by 
multiplying the most recent transaction price by the relevant inflation index.  The total of 
 61
house price appreciations of 1,365 single-family houses 3  due to brownfield 
redevelopment within one-mile radius of the brownfield is $ 8,733,438 (2004 dollars).   
Figure 4-3: Price-Distance Slope Before and After
Remediation
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: the percent difference here is actually % in lnPrice, but when the percentage is less 
than .1, the two numbers are close.  
 
 
4.1.6 Discounted Cash-Flow Analysis for Brownfield Investment 
Based on the public benefits and public investment, I perform a social benefit-cost 
analysis.  On the social-cost/investment side, there are three public funds for this 
project.  EPA allocated an assessment fund of $50,525 in 1999.  The city offered a 
property-tax reduction of $321,422 over 13 years, i.e., $24,725 per year from 2003 to 
2016, and a 5% investment tax credit.  I assume that DGI allocated its total investment 
$3.7 million evenly in two years of the development period.  The available tax credits in 
                                                        
3 Some houses are sold twice during 1994 to 2006.  So there are 1830 transactions, which are more than the number of houses. 
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2003 and 2004 are $23,125 (3,700,000*0.05*25%/2) annually (Table 4-6).  On the 
social-benefits side, local residents’ benefits are $8,733,438 in 2004 dollars.   
Based on the net social benefits, I derive that the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for this 
social investment is 180%.  It is much higher than average returns for public projects.  
The Net Present Social Value (NPSV) is equal to $6.5 million.  If the effect for all of 
houses is realized in 2006, the IRR will drop to 109%, while NPSV is $6.4 Million.  I 
perform a further stress test by using only houses within a half-mile.  The public benefits 
drop to $1.73 million, while the IRR is 57% and NPSV is $0.91 million. 
Table 4-6: Discounted Cash Flow for Brockton Brownfield 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 …
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 …
Assess Fund (50,025)         …
Property Tax 
Reduction     (24,725) (24,725) (24,725) (24,725) (24,725)
…
Tax Credit     (23,125) (23,125)    …
Public 
Benefits      8,733,438    
…
Net Social 
Benefits (50,025) 0 0 0 (70,975) 8,662,463 (24,725) (24,725) (24,725)
…
IRR 180%         …
NPV 6,555,078         
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
4.1.7 Conclusion 
This brownfield has negative impacts on housing price before remediation.  Brownfield 
redevelopment has generated benefits to local residents, which are reflected in housing 
market.  This case verifies the hypothesis of this study.  From the social perspective, 
NPSV is positive and public funds can be strongly justified by its social benefits.   
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4.2 Case Two: Gardner, MA 
Table 4-7: Highlights of the 30 Wickman Drirve Site in Gardner, MA 
Redevelopment End Use affordable housing 
Site Location 30 Wickman Drive, Gardner, MA 01440 
Size 1.1 acres 
Pollution Types EPHs, SVOCs, and lead 
Abandon Date 1995 
Remediation Start Date 2002 
Remediation Finish Date 2002 
Total Government Funds $212,000 
Available Transaction Data  300 
Source: EPA Region 1 Brownfield website.   
http://www.epa.gov/newengland/brownfields/success/gardner.htm
Note: EPHs for Ethanol, 2-phenoxy-; SVOCs for semi-volatile organic compounds.  
 
4.2.1 Site Description 
The brownfield site in Gardner, MA (Table 4-7, Figure 4-5, Figure 4-6) was a 
redevelopment of a former light manufacturing and welding shop.  The city foreclosed 
the property in 2000 after it was vacant and had defaulted on its property tax for 5 years.  
The city secured the EPA Assessment fund of $47,000 to complete Phase two 
environmental assessment and identified the contaminants of EPHs, SVOCs, and lead.  
The Greater Gardner Community Development Corporation was awarded the 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) of $165,000 to redevelop the site as a 
three, single-family units of affordable housing in 2003. (Source: 
http://www.epa.gov/newengland/brownfields/success/gardner.htm) 
The GIS map shows the location of the brownfield, single-family houses in a half-mile 
radius, streets, highways, and context (Figure 4-4).  The photo and air photo show the 
redeveloped site and its context (Figure 4-5). 
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Figure 4-4: ArcGIS Map of Gardner, Half-Mile Radius of the Brownfield Site 
 
Source: ArcGIS, U.S. StreetMap 9.1; Single-family addressed by Warren Group 
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Figure 4-5: Photograph and Air Photograph of the Brownfield Site in Gardner, MA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EPA Region 1 Brownfield Success Stories and Google Earth 2006. 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Data Set 
The data set in Gardner contains 300 single-family housing transactions within a 
half-mile radius of the target brownfield site, with the sale years ranging from 1995 to 
2006.  The span covers pre-remediation and post redevelopment periods.  Descriptive 
statistics for all the variables used in the model are shown in Table 4-8.   
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Table 4-8: Descriptive Statistics for the Brownfield in Gardner, MA 
Descriptive Statistics
300 51,000 274,900 120,549 47,134
300 .046 .799 .473 .208
300 .002 .638 .267 .187
300 1.0 2.5 1.287 .4302
300 2.28 67.52 9.96 7.74
300 5.21 4558.68 158.82 414.10
300 .528 2.046 1.241 .273
300 .279 4.186 1.615 .694
300 0 167 73.76 25.891
300 0 1 .04 .196
300 0 1 .10 .296
300 0 1 .09 .287
300 0 1 .10 .301
300 0 1 .11 .309
300 0 1 .07 .261
300 0 1 .06 .244
300 0 1 .10 .296
300 0 1 .10 .305
300 0 1 .13 .333
300 0 1 .09 .282
300 0 1 .02 .128
300 0 0 .00 .000
300 0 1 .17 .379
300 0 0 .00 .000
300 0 1 .02 .128
300 0 0 .00 .000
300 0 1 .02 .140
300 0 0 .00 .000
300 0 1 .01 .082
300 0 1 .15 .354
300 0 1 .01 .082
300
PRICE
DISTANCE
DIST_SQ
BATHROOMS
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
Living_area
LVGAREA2
AGE
SOLD_95
SOLD_96
SOLD_97
SOLD_98
SOLD_99
SOLD_00
SOLD_01
SOLD_02
SOLD_03
SOLD_04
SOLD_05
SOLD_06
style_anti
style_bnl
Style_cape
style_COLONIAL
sty_CONTEMP
style_FAMILY
style_MOBILE
style_rsrach
style_ranch
style_split
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
4.2.3 Data Analyses 
Below are the major results of data analyses. 
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Price.  To exclude non arm-length transactions, I exclude transactions with sale prices 
lower than $50,000.  The scatterplot of price and distance for excluded observations 
show that these points are evenly distributed in different distances. 
Distance.  I select a half-mile radius to cover the impact region, taking into account the 
topography and another brownfield of 0.7 miles to the west.  Housing within a half-mile 
should avoid these noise. 
Living area, bathroom, and bedroom.  The Pearson correlation between living area and 
bedroom is 0.52 and is significant at the 0.01 level.  I regress ln(price) on living area and 
bedroom separately.  Living area results in a more significant coefficient, therefore, I 
exclude the number of bedrooms.  
Lot size and living area.  Both lot size and living area variables exhibit a quadratic form.  
I therefore add the squares of lot size and age to the model. 
4.2.4 Review of Regression Results 
Through independent regressions and collinearity tests, I select the independent 
variables and their forms.  I conduct regressions by using SPSS for the entire data set 
(Table 4-9).  The regression model achieves a reasonably good result.  The R square 
indicates that 75% of variation in ln(price) can be explained by all the independent 
variables listed in Table 4-9.  Most independent variables are statistically significant at 
95% confidence level.   
 
 68
Table 4-9: Regression Results for the Brownfield in Gardner, MA 
Model Summary
.908 .824 .809 .170
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
 
Coefficientsa
10.493 .171 61.487 .000
-.145 .051 -.077 -2.858 .005
1.767E-02 .004 .350 4.720 .000
-2.91E-04 .000 -.308 -4.257 .000
1.079 .243 .753 4.434 .000
-.320 .095 -.568 -3.354 .001
-1.78E-03 .001 -.118 -2.895 .004
-6.49E-02 .060 -.049 -1.085 .279
-2.85E-02 .061 -.021 -.468 .640
4.142E-03 .059 .003 .070 .944
8.177E-02 .059 .065 1.397 .163
.209 .063 .140 3.333 .001
.475 .064 .297 7.439 .000
.496 .059 .376 8.348 .000
.673 .059 .525 11.484 .000
.809 .058 .690 14.069 .000
.910 .061 .657 15.019 .000
.833 .092 .274 9.087 .000
4.928E-02 .034 .048 1.452 .148
-2.45E-02 .082 -.008 -.298 .766
9.984E-02 .073 .036 1.366 .173
.165 .136 .034 1.210 .227
5.668E-02 .043 .051 1.327 .186
.109 .128 .023 .851 .396
(Constant)
DISTANCE
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
LIVING_A
LVGAREA2
AGE
SOLD_96
SOLD_97
SOLD_98
SOLD_99
SOLD_00
SOLD_01
SOLD_02
SOLD_03
SOLD_04
SOLD_05
SOLD_06
STYLE_BN
STYLE_CO
STYLE_FA
STYLE_RS
STYLE_RA
STYLE_SP
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LN_PRICEa. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
z The housing price appreciation from 1995 to 2006 is 83.3%.  Housing prices 
appreciated greatly from 2002 to 2004. 
z Houses of 10 year older have 1.78% of lower average prices.   
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z The coefficient for distance is -0.145 and significant at 95% confidence interval. 
z Both living area and lot size present a quadratic form.  The price premium increases 
as the living area/lot size grows, but decreases as it reaches a certain point (linear 
coefficient/(2*quadratic coefficient).  A living area of 1,686 square feet (SF) has the 
largest price premium.  The maximum price premium is realized for a lot size of 
30,361 SF. 
 
4.2.5 Comparison between Before and After Remediation Effects 
I split the data set into two periods, 1996 to 2001 and 2002 to 2006, which cover the pre- 
and post-remediation periods.  They consist of 183 and 119 cases respectively. The 
first data set captures the housing price before remediation, when brownfields should 
have negative price impacts.  The second one reflects housing price changes in the 
post-redevelopment period.   I conduct two additional regressions to (1) test the 
brownfield has negative housing price impact before remediation; (2) test the hypothesis 
that brownfield cleanup and redevelopment have significant positive impacts on housing 
prices; and (3) calculate the housing-price improvements due to brownfield 
redevelopment.   
The R square results in Tables 4-10 and 4-11 show that the first formula explains 61.9% 
of variation in the natural logarithm of housing prices, and the second one explains 
47.2% of variation.   Both estimates are less precise than the regression for the whole 
data set, due to smaller sample sizes. 
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 Table 4-10: Regression Results for the Brownfield in Gardner, MA, 1996 to 2001 
Model Summary
.812 .660 .619 .155
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
 
Coefficientsa
9.940 .260 38.250 .000
-.134 .064 -.114 -2.108 .037
9.352E-03 .005 .249 1.785 .076
-7.66E-05 .000 -.086 -.640 .523
1.985 .392 2.101 5.068 .000
-.665 .147 -1.840 -4.515 .000
-2.37E-03 .001 -.246 -3.171 .002
4.664E-02 .044 .070 1.068 .287
6.503E-02 .042 .102 1.560 .121
.167 .041 .268 4.043 .000
.279 .045 .386 6.209 .000
.537 .048 .698 11.184 .000
1.873E-02 .039 .030 .476 .635
-1.19E-03 .076 -.001 -.016 .988
.120 .112 .054 1.076 .284
.133 .132 .059 1.004 .317
.109 .054 .151 2.007 .047
8.269E-02 .119 .037 .694 .489
(Constant)
DISTANCE
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
LIVING_A
LVGAREA2
AGE
SOLD_97
SOLD_98
SOLD_99
SOLD_00
SOLD_01
STYLE_BN
STYLE_CO
STYLE_FA
STYLE_RS
STYLE_RA
STYLE_SP
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LN_PRICEa. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
 
The price-distance gradient is negative before remediation, which means the residents’ 
willingness to pay for living close to the site.  It could be attributed to unidentified 
amenities in the neighborhood.  The negative price impact of the brownfield cannot be 
verified.   
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Table 4-11: Regression Results for the Brownfield in Gardner, MA, 2002 to 2006 
Model Summary
.725 .526 .472 .183
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
 
Coefficientsa
11.136 .236 47.132 .000
-.181 .083 -.145 -2.192 .030
2.450E-02 .007 .765 3.510 .001
-4.37E-04 .000 -.839 -3.918 .000
.644 .346 .722 1.861 .065
-.141 .141 -.394 -1.003 .318
-6.72E-04 .001 -.067 -.604 .547
.165 .049 .280 3.398 .001
.300 .046 .544 6.454 .000
.413 .051 .659 8.060 .000
.327 .091 .251 3.597 .000
7.723E-02 .063 .111 1.226 .223
2.710E-02 .101 .019 .268 .789
4.356E-02 .074 .063 .590 .556
(Constant)
DISTANCE
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
LIVING_A
LVGAREA2
AGE
SOLD_03
SOLD_04
SOLD_05
SOLD_06
STYLE_BN
STYLE_FA
STYLE_RA
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LN_PRICEa. 
  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
The gradient decreases from -0.134 to -0.181.  Because the previous analyses cannot 
demonstrate the significant difference of two slopes, I merge two regressions by adding 
two groups of dummy variables.  The redevelopment dummy is equal to 1 if the sales 
year is larger than 2001, and equal to 0 for the other cases.  I multiply the distance 
variable by the redevelopment dummy to get the distance dummy (d_distance) and 
multiply structural variables by the redevelopment dummy to calculate structural 
dummies (e.g. d_lotsize, d_age).  I perform a regression for the whole dataset.  The 
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distance dummy is 0.0252 but not significant (Table 4-12), which means the change of 
slope is not significant.   Hence, further regression analysis shows that the brownfield 
redevelopment’s impacts on housing price cannot be verified. 
 
4.2.6 Conclusion 
The local residents’ benefits from brownfield redevelopment are not significant in the 
Gardner case.  I cannot verify either of the hypothesis of brownfield redevelopment or 
disamenity of the brownfield, perhaps because of the noise of other unidentified 
amenities close to the site or local residents’ unawareness of the pollution.  Thus, the 
brownfield redevelopment’s improvement on housing price is uncertain.  
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Table 4-12: Regression Results for the Brownfield in Gardner, MA with Distance 
and Structural Dummies 
Model Summary
.915 .837 .817 .167
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Coefficientsa
9.992 .274 36.433 .000
-.181 .075 -.096 -2.409 .017
2.450E-02 .006 .486 3.858 .000
-4.37E-04 .000 -.464 -4.306 .000
.644 .315 .449 2.045 .042
-.141 .128 -.251 -1.102 .271
-6.72E-04 .001 -.045 -.663 .508
-3.81E-02 .060 -.029 -.634 .527
1.002E-02 .062 .007 .163 .871
2.711E-02 .059 .021 .461 .645
.130 .059 .103 2.209 .028
.242 .063 .162 3.861 .000
.499 .063 .312 7.894 .000
1.144 .348 .867 3.283 .001
1.309 .348 1.022 3.766 .000
1.444 .348 1.232 4.153 .000
1.557 .348 1.124 4.473 .000
1.471 .356 .483 4.135 .000
7.723E-02 .057 .075 1.348 .179
2.710E-02 .092 .010 .294 .769
4.356E-02 .067 .040 .648 .517
2.524E-02 .101 .019 .250 .803
-1.75E-02 .008 -.346 -2.135 .034
4.144E-04 .000 .296 2.777 .006
1.304 .517 2.196 2.520 .012
-.505 .201 -1.262 -2.515 .012
-1.39E-03 .001 -.144 -1.090 .277
-4.64E-02 .071 -.037 -.654 .514
1.175E-02 .082 .004 .143 .886
9.118E-02 .152 .019 .600 .549
.174 .141 .036 1.237 .217
8.940E-02 .088 .062 1.014 .312
.111 .128 .023 .870 .385
(Constant)
DISTANCE
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
LIVING_A
LVGAREA2
AGE
SOLD_96
SOLD_97
SOLD_98
SOLD_99
SOLD_00
SOLD_01
SOLD_02
SOLD_03
SOLD_04
SOLD_05
SOLD_06
STYLE_BN
STYLE_FA
STYLE_RA
d_distance
d_lotsize
D_LOT2
D_LVGA
D_LVGA2
D_AGE
D_BN
D_CO
D_FA
D_RS
D_RA
D_SP
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LN_PRICEa.  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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4.3 Case 3: Lynn, MA 
 
Table 4-13: Highlights of Empire Laundry Site in Lynn, MA 
Redevelopment End Use single-family affordable housing 
Site Location 33-35 Myrtle St, Lynn, MA 01905 
Size 36,000 SF 
Pollution Types Solvents 
Abandon Date 1993 
Remediation Start Date 2000 
Remediation Finish Date 2002 
Total Government Funds $355,000 
No. of Transaction Data Available 855 
Source: EPA Region One Brownfield Website. 
http://www.epa.gov/NE/brownfields/success/lynn.htm
 
4.3.1 Site Description 
The brownfield site in Lynn, MA (Table 4-13) was a redevelopment of a formal 
commercial laundry facility.  The laundry had been operating from the early 1990’s until 
1993.  The city foreclosed the property in 1996 after it was abandoned in 1993.  The 
city was awarded a $20,000 grant from EPA to perform an environmental assessment in 
1998 and identified hazardous materials, such as solvents.  In 1999, the city secured 
$420,000 from Brownfields Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund and a $100,000 pilot grant 
from the EPA to cleanup the site.  The cleanup was completed in 2002 with the removal 
of 2,423 pounds of solid waste, 324 gallons of liquid waste, and 163 bags of 
asbestos-tainted materials.   
(Source: EPA Region 1 Brownfield website: 
http://www.epa.gov/NE/brownfields/success/lynn.htm) 
The following map shows the location of the brownfield and single-family houses in a 
half-mile (Figure 4-6).  The photo and air photo show the site before and after 
remediation and its neighborhood (Figure 4-7). 
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Figure 4-6: ArcGIS Map of Lynn, Half-Mile Radius of the Brownfield Site 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ArcGIS, U.S. StreetMap 9.1; Single-family addressed by Warren Group 
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Figure 4-7: Photograph and Air Photograph of the Empire Laundry Site in Lynn, 
MA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before Remediation                         After Remediation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Context Photo 
Source: EPA Region 1 Brownfield Success Stories and Google Earth 2006. 
4.3.2 Data Set 
The Lynn, MA site contains 855 single-family housing transactions within a half-mile 
radius of the target brownfield site, with the sale years ranging from 1994 to 2006.  The 
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span covers pre-remediation and post-redevelopment periods.  Descriptive statistics for 
all the variables used in the model are shown in Table 4-14.  
  
Table 4-14: Descriptive Statistics for the Brownfield in Lynn, MA 
Descriptive Statistics
855 51,000 475,000 166,589 79,057
855 .009 .800 .494 .193
855 .000 .639 .281 .180
855 .257 1.761 1.016 .354
855 .871 29.621 5.024 2.329
855 .759 877.404 30.655 42.250
855 .595 3.456 1.276 .312
855 .354 11.944 1.724 .951
855 0 248 82.66 30.289
855 0 1 .06 .235
855 0 1 .06 .241
855 0 1 .08 .267
855 0 1 .08 .278
855 0 1 .08 .267
855 0 1 .09 .291
855 0 1 .08 .267
855 0 1 .08 .274
855 0 1 .08 .269
855 0 1 .10 .296
855 0 1 .10 .301
855 0 1 .09 .291
855 0 1 .02 .136
855 0 1 .02 .136
855 0 1 .17 .380
855 0 1 .19 .392
855 0 1 .00 .034
855 0 0 .00 .000
855 0 1 .00 .068
855 0 1 .07 .258
855 0 0 .00 .000
855 0 1 .01 .096
855 0 1 .01 .090
855 0 0 .00 .000
855
PRICE
DISTANCE
DIST_SQ
DISTGE
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
Living_area
Lvg_area2
AGE
SOLD_94
SOLD_95
SOLD_96
SOLD_97
SOLD_98
SOLD_99
SOLD_00
SOLD_01
SOLD_02
SOLD_03
SOLD_04
SOLD_05
SOLD_06
STY_BNGL
style_cape
style_colonial
sty_contemp
STY_MUL
sty_raise
sty_ranch
STY_SPL
STY_SPE
STY_TWO
style_victorian
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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4.3.3 Data Analyses 
Below are the major results of data analyses. 
Price.  To exclude non arm-length transactions, I exclude transactions with sale prices 
lower than $50,000.  The exclusion does not skew the price and distance relationship. 
Distance.  I select a half-mile radius to cover the impact region, considering the 
topography in the North and South.  Housing within a half-mile should avoid this noise.  
In addition, the GE (General Electric) Industrial Complex on the South may have a much 
larger impact on housing prices than the small brownfield.  I add the distance to GE site 
into the regression to reflect its impact. 
Living area, bathroom, and bedroom.  The Pearson correlation between living area and 
bedroom and bathroom is 0.473 and 0.416 and both correlation coefficients are 
significant at the 0.01 level.  Based on regression analyses, I select only the living-area 
variable. 
Lot size, living area, and age.  I perform separate regressions on lot size, living area, 
age.  Lot size and living area exhibit quadratic forms, while age presents a linear form. 
4.3.4 Review of Regression Results 
The regression model achieves a reasonably good result.  The R square indicates that 
83.3% of variation in ln(price) can be explained by all the independent variables listed in 
Table 4-15.  Most independent variables are statistically significant at 95% confidence 
level.   
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Table 4-15: Regression Results for the Brownfield in Lynn, MA 
Model Summary
.916 .838 .833 .201
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
 
Coefficientsa
10.633 .109 97.258 .000
.246 .168 .096 1.465 .143
-.228 .181 -.084 -1.259 .209
.134 .023 .097 5.885 .000
2.495E-02 .007 .118 3.440 .001
-7.05E-04 .000 -.061 -1.899 .058
.590 .127 .374 4.637 .000
-.119 .043 -.231 -2.782 .006
-1.77E-03 .000 -.109 -5.045 .000
-6.37E-02 .040 -.031 -1.596 .111
4.257E-02 .038 .023 1.117 .264
.114 .037 .064 3.051 .002
.243 .038 .132 6.392 .000
.360 .036 .214 9.872 .000
.524 .038 .285 13.799 .000
.721 .037 .403 19.237 .000
.928 .038 .507 24.501 .000
1.011 .036 .609 27.876 .000
1.111 .036 .680 30.665 .000
1.180 .037 .700 32.275 .000
1.069 .058 .295 18.422 .000
1.516E-02 .026 .012 .582 .560
-1.35E-02 .022 -.011 -.624 .533
.104 .270 .007 .386 .700
2.412E-02 .105 .003 .229 .819
1.984E-02 .035 .010 .573 .567
7.808E-02 .078 .015 1.006 .315
1.791E-02 .080 .003 .224 .823
(Constant)
DISTANCE
DIST_SQ
DISTGE
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
Living_area
Lvg_area2
AGE
SOLD_95
SOLD_96
SOLD_97
SOLD_98
SOLD_99
SOLD_00
SOLD_01
SOLD_02
SOLD_03
SOLD_04
SOLD_05
SOLD_06
style_cape
style_colonial
sty_contemp
sty_raise
sty_ranch
STY_SPE
STY_TWO
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LN_PRICEa. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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z The housing-price appreciation from 1994 to 2006 is 106.9%.  Housing prices 
appreciated greatly during 1997 to 2004. 
z A living area of 2,479 SF has the largest price premium, while the maximum price 
premium is realized at a Lot size of 17,695 SF. 
z Houses that are 10 years older have a 1.8% of lower average prices.  
z The styles do not have significant price premiums. 
z The coefficient for distance to the brownfield is positive but not significant, while 
distance to the GE Industrial Complex exhibits significant price impacts.  One 
thousand meters away from the GE site provides a 13.4% price premium. 
 
4.3.5 Comparison Between Before and After Remediation Effects 
I split the data set into two parts, i.e., 1994 to 2001 and 2002 to 2006, which covers the 
pre- and post-remediation periods.  They consist of 522 and 324 cases, respectively.  I 
perform regressions on both of the two sub-datasets by using the same variables for the 
whole sample.  The first data set captures the housing price before remediation, when 
brownfields should have negative price impacts.  The second one reflects housing price 
changes in the post-redevelopment period.   
The R square results in Tables 4-16 and 4-17 show that the first regression explains 
63.3% of variation in the natural logarithm of housing prices, and the second one 
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explains 57.9% of variation.   Both estimates are less precise than the regression for 
the whole data set, due to smaller sample sizes. 
 
Table 4-16: Regression Results for the Brownfield in Lynn, MA, 1994 to 2001 
(Pre-Remediation) 
Model Summary
.805 .649 .633 .210
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Coefficientsa
10.574 .136 77.801 .000
7.902E-02 .053 .042 1.489 .137
.109 .031 .111 3.559 .000
3.347E-02 .009 .234 3.642 .000
-1.06E-03 .000 -.150 -2.491 .013
.779 .160 .674 4.854 .000
-.186 .053 -.476 -3.497 .001
-2.42E-03 .000 -.209 -4.892 .000
-7.00E-02 .042 -.061 -1.668 .096
4.194E-02 .040 .040 1.047 .295
.108 .039 .107 2.749 .006
.248 .040 .237 6.188 .000
.366 .038 .380 9.517 .000
.534 .040 .511 13.346 .000
.728 .040 .715 18.393 .000
1.769E-02 .073 .007 .242 .809
-3.42E-03 .036 -.004 -.094 .925
-2.33E-02 .029 -.026 -.800 .424
8.022E-02 .155 .014 .517 .605
1.689E-02 .046 .013 .365 .715
2.806E-02 .095 .009 .294 .769
5.338E-02 .109 .013 .489 .625
(Constant)
DISTANCE
DISTGE
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
LIVING_A
LVGA2
AGE
SOLD_95
SOLD_96
SOLD_97
SOLD_98
SOLD_99
SOLD_00
SOLD_01
STY_BNGL
STYLE_CA
STYLE_CO
STY_RAIS
STY_RANC
STY_SPE
STY_TWO
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LN_PRICEa. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 4-17: Regression Results for the Brownfield in Lynn, MA, 2002 to 2006 
(Post Remediation) 
Model Summary
.777 .604 .579 .136
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
 
Coefficientsa
11.794 .127 92.683 .000
-2.92E-02 .041 -.028 -.712 .477
.135 .025 .227 5.340 .000
3.379E-02 .013 .349 2.557 .011
-1.52E-03 .001 -.211 -1.589 .113
.172 .171 .269 1.008 .314
2.803E-02 .059 .139 .478 .633
-5.36E-04 .000 -.079 -1.463 .144
7.909E-02 .023 .164 3.419 .001
.172 .023 .360 7.462 .000
.238 .023 .488 10.222 .000
.169 .039 .169 4.279 .000
-.103 .054 -.072 -1.907 .057
4.565E-02 .026 .086 1.734 .084
-2.23E-03 .024 -.004 -.093 .926
-.529 .280 -.140 -1.887 .060
-1.28E-02 .102 -.005 -.125 .901
.104 .042 .110 2.493 .013
.154 .105 .057 1.464 .144
.310 .120 .115 2.584 .010
(Constant)
DISTANCE
DISTGE
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
LIVING_A
LVGA2
AGE
SOLD_03
SOLD_04
SOLD_05
SOLD_06
STY_BNGL
STYLE_CA
STYLE_CO
STY_CONT
STY_RAIS
STY_RANC
STY_SPE
STY_TWO
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LN_PRICEa. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The price-distance gradient before remediation is positive but not significant.  The 
brownfield’ negative price impact cannot be verified.  One possible reason is that the 
GE site has larger impacts and the distance to the GE site cannot capture the entire 
price impacts precisely.  Another possible reason could be that other major 
development or disamenities in the radius are neglected in the model. 
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The gradient decreases from 0.079 to -0.0292 after remediation.  Brownfield 
redevelopment could lower the gradient, i.e., improving housing prices.  However, I 
cannot determine whether the difference is significant.  I merge two regressions by 
adding two groups of dummy variables.  The redevelopment dummy is equal to 1 if the 
sales year is larger than 2001, and equal to 0 for the other cases.  I multiply the 
distance variable by the redevelopment dummy to get the distance dummy (d_distance) 
and multiply structural variables by the redevelopment dummy to calculate structural 
dummies (e.g. d_lotsize, d_age).  I perform a regression for the whole dataset.  The 
distance dummy is -0.103 but not significant (Table 4-18), which means the positive price 
impact is not significant.   Hence, further regression analysis shows that the brownfield 
redevelopment’s positive impacts on housing price cannot be verified. 
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Table 4-18: Regression Results for the Brownfield in Lynn, MA with Distance and 
Structural Dummies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations.
Coefficientsa
10.574 .129 81.724 .000
7.902E-02 .051 .031 1.564 .118
.109 .029 .078 3.738 .000
-.103 .078 -.057 -1.327 .185
6.037E-02 .047 .066 1.291 .197
-3.09E-02 .021 -.172 -1.496 .135
1.756E-03 .001 .082 1.266 .206
-.669 .292 -.895 -2.294 .022
.241 .099 .525 2.424 .016
1.502E-03 .001 .140 2.108 .035
-.132 .106 -.024 -1.254 .210
5.042E-02 .052 .027 .972 .332
1.217E-02 .045 .007 .272 .786
-.118 .211 -.012 -.558 .577
-1.37E-02 .073 -.004 -.186 .852
.118 .179 .012 .660 .510
-.123 .170 -.015 -.722 .471
3.347E-02 .009 .159 3.825 .000
-1.06E-03 .000 -.092 -2.616 .009
.779 .153 .494 5.099 .000
-.186 .051 -.360 -3.673 .000
-2.42E-03 .000 -.149 -5.139 .000
-7.00E-02 .040 -.034 -1.752 .080
4.194E-02 .038 .023 1.100 .272
.108 .037 .061 2.888 .004
.248 .038 .134 6.500 .000
.366 .037 .217 9.996 .000
.534 .038 .290 14.019 .000
.728 .038 .406 19.321 .000
1.328 .225 .726 5.909 .000
1.417 .223 .854 6.358 .000
1.501 .222 .919 6.775 .000
1.577 .222 .935 7.092 .000
1.472 .228 .406 6.467 .000
1.769E-02 .070 .005 .254 .800
-3.42E-03 .035 -.003 -.098 .922
-2.33E-02 .028 -.019 -.841 .401
-.632 .410 -.044 -1.543 .123
8.022E-02 .148 .011 .543 .587
1.689E-02 .044 .009 .383 .702
2.806E-02 .091 .005 .309 .758
5.338E-02 .104 .010 .513 .608
(Constant)
DISTANCE
DISTGE
d_distance
D_GE
d_lotsize
D_LOT2
D_LIVA
D_LIVA2
D_AGE
D_BNGL
D_CA
D_CO
D_RAIS
D_RANC
D_SPE
D_TWO
LOTSIZE
LOTSIZE2
LIVING_A
LVGA2
AGE
SOLD_95
SOLD_96
SOLD_97
SOLD_98
SOLD_99
SOLD_00
SOLD_01
SOLD_02
SOLD_03
SOLD_04
SOLD_05
SOLD_06
STY_BNGL
STYLE_CA
STYLE_CO
STY_CONT
STY_RAIS
STY_RANC
STY_SPE
STY_TWO
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LN_PRICEa. 
Model Summary
.918 .842 .834 .200
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
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4.3.6 Conclusion 
The local residents’ benefits from brownfield redevelopment are not significant in the 
Lynn case.  This brownfield project’s public funds cannot be justified by its public 
benefits generated, at least when considering only the local residents’ benefits.  I 
cannot verify either the hypothesis of brownfield redevelopment, nor can I identify the 
disamenity of the brownfield, which could be attributed to the noise of the GE site and 
local residents’ unawareness of the pollution.  Local residents may not realize the actual 
risk posed by the brownfield site, given the nature of the site (a former laundry).  The 
brownfield redevelopment’s impact on housing prices is positive but not significant.  
 
4.4. Major Findings from Case Studies 
I perform hedonic-model analyses and social benefits and costs analyses on three 
brownfield redevelopment cases in Massachusetts.  The hypothesis of this study is only 
verified in the case in Brockton, where the NPSV is positive and IRR is larger than other 
government projects. 
The level of negative impacts of brownfields varies 
As indicated from the three case studies, the negative housing price impacts of the 
brownfield in Lynn are not significant and the brownfield in Brockton exhibits a maximum 
of 10% negative price impact, while the brownfield price impact in Gardner is hidden by 
other impacts.  Although I use “brownfield” as a single name for polluted properties, the 
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severity of pollution and the local residents’ awareness of pollution may vary.  Those are 
two of many reasons why price impacts vary. 
The benefits of redevelopment are smaller than expected 
Only one of the three cases shows a significant positive price impact of brownfield 
redevelopment.  Although brownfield cleanup and redevelopment generate benefits to 
local residents, the housing market may not reflect the positive impacts.  Compared to 
other impacts (e.g. the opening of a shopping mall), brownfields’ impacts are less 
pronounced in many cases. 
The social return can be very high 
As shown in the Brockton case, the social benefits are much larger than the public funds 
invested.  Brownfield funds serves as a catalyst for private investment.  One word of 
caution is that I cannot verify if the funds are allocated optimally in the Brockton case, 
because I do not have the private NPV information.  Private investors may have positive 
private NPV and public funds may not be necessary for this remediation and 
redevelopment. 
 
4.5 Cautions when Interpreting Results 
Readers should be cautious when interpreting and applying the results.  The case 
studies employ social benefit-cost analyses and the benefits are based on the hedonic 
method.  I have made many assumptions and approximations. 
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Selection Bias 
The three cases are selected from the successful redevelopment projects in 
Massachusetts funded by EPA.  They probably do not represent the general situations 
of brownfield redevelopment in the United States. 
Partial Consideration of Public Benefits 
As discussed in Chapter 3, I only consider local residents’ benefits.  The estimated 
benefits are lower than total public benefits.  Therefore, I can only verify that a project 
has a positive NPSV, but I cannot verify that a project’s NPSV is negative, because of 
unconsidered benefits.  
Perceived Benefits and Real Benefits 
I realize that there are two types of benefits, i.e., perceived benefits and real benefits.  A 
hedonic model only reflects the perceived risks/benefits, which may be different from the 
real risks/benefits.  Real benefits come from the reduced health risks, green-space 
saving, efficient use of infrastructure, etc.  Perceived benefits come from the reduction 
of perceived risks and the disamenity.  McClelland et al. (1990) showed that the risks 
perceived by residents are different from real risk measured by scientific analysis.  For 
example, the potential environmental risks in the Lynn brownfield are severe.  However, 
the perceived risks could be low, given the nature of the site, a former commercial 
laundry.   
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The Composition of Housing Price Appreciation 
For this study, I measure the brownfield redevelopment’s impact on housing price by 
using hedonic models to aggregate the three effects for neighborhood residents: (1) the 
local residents’ benefits of brownfield remediation and redevelopment, (2) economic 
benefits of living close to the redeveloped project, and (3) negative costs of the 
redeveloped use (e.g. traffic, noise, and crime).  I assume that the aggregate values of 
these benefits and costs are close to local residents’ benefits from brownfield cleanup 
and redevelopment. 
Net or Transfer of Benefits 
The housing price appreciation consists of the transfer of market demand and the net 
benefits from brownfield redevelopment.  The improvement of housing price in an area 
after remediation may reduce the price or demand of housing in another area.  I was not 
able to differentiate the differences of net benefits or a transfer of benefits.  A further 
study using a general equilibrium model is needed to fit in the gap.  
The Nature of Redevelopment 
I notice that both of the two cases with insignificant price impact have end uses of 
affordable housing.  Affordable housing has lower-than-market rate prices, which may 
lower the neighborhood housing prices.   Both of these factors can decrease the 
significance of housing price appreciation due to brownfield redevelopment.  
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The Short Period of Post-Remediation 
The three redevelopments were completed less than four year ago.  The short time 
window may not allow the effect of cleanup and redevelopment to be reflected in housing 
market.   
Development Dynamics 
One of the major assumptions of hedonic models is that other amenities and 
disamenities do not change between pre- and post-remediation periods so that we can 
cancel out their effects by calculating the difference of two distance slopes.  If the 
development activities are active during the observation period, they may make it difficult 
to interpret the regression results. 
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 Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I first highlight the major findings from this study.  Then, I discuss the 
limitations of current methodologies and the directions of future improvements.  Finally, 
I propose policy recommendations on how to improve the efficiency of brownfield 
policies. 
In this study, I create a quantitative framework for allocating brownfield funds and apply 
social benefit-cost analysis to evaluate the efficiency of current financing programs by 
examining three brownfield redevelopment cases in Massachusetts.  I hope that this 
new perspective brought by this empirical study will give some thoughts for regulators 
and researchers.  
 
5.1 The Major Findings of This Study 
In this study, I propose the flow chart for an optimal brownfield-funding decision.  I test 
the hypothesis that some brownfield funds are allocated to projects with negative net 
present social values (NPSVs), i.e., suboptimal.  The social costs are brownfield funds 
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allocated to a project.  I only consider local residents’ benefits, one of the three public 
benefits from brownfield redevelopment.  I use hedonic models to measure indirectly 
local residents’ benefits.  Among three brownfield cases, I verify that only one of them 
brownfield funds has a positive NPSV, though I cannot prove if public funds are allocated 
optimally in this case, due to lack of private NPV information. 
5.1.1 The Ideal Situation for an Optimal Brownfield Funding Decision 
Ideally, the brownfield funds can be allocated, according to the flow chart proposed in 
Chapter 3.  Projects that have positive or zero private net present values (NPVs) are not 
eligible for funding application.  Projects with negative private NPVs but positive net 
present social values (NPSV) can enter the pool of funding consideration.  If funds are 
limited, the priorities are given to the projects with the largest NPSVs. 
5.1.2 Measurement of Public Benefits and Costs 
The social costs or investments for brownfield redevelopment are relatively easy to 
obtain.  Basically, they are public funds from different sources, such as EPA, HUD, 
states, and cities.  I ignore the indirect costs, such as infrastructure, traffic, noises, and 
new pollution from a redeveloped use, of a redevelopment for the society are ignored in 
this study.   
I categorize public benefits of brownfield redevelopment into three parts based on the 
types of recipients: (1) local residents’ willingness to pay for environmental, health, and 
aesthetic values; (2) local businesses’ willingness to pay for increased engagement of 
customers and employees; (3) the nationals’ willingness to pay for environmental 
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improvement, e.g. green space saving.  I can measure the first two types indirectly 
through hedonic models on residential properties and commercial properties.  Other 
studies measure the local residents’ benefits directly, i.e., translate environmental risks of 
brownfields into the number of cancer or other diseases cases averted in the impact 
region and then assign monetary values to derive the benefits of brownfield 
redevelopment (Hamilton and Viscusi 1999).  I could measure the last part by using 
contingent valuation, which measures the public’s willingness-to-pay for non-market 
goods through surveys and questionnaires.  Due to the access of data and time 
limitation, I only focus on the first type of public benefits, i.e., local residents’ benefits by 
using hedonic-model analyses.  It is evident that the benefits I estimate would be lower 
than the full public benefits.  However, the other two types of benefits are more 
controversial and their boundaries are more blurry. 
5.1.3 Background Noise for the Impacts of Brownfields and Brownfield 
Redevelopment 
As shown in the three case studies, brownfields’ negative impacts are not pronounced as 
expected, which may be attributed to several reasons.  First, housing price impacts 
reflect perceived risks of brownfields.  Due to the varying level of environmental 
awareness, housing market may not reflect the real environmental risks.  The 
environmental awareness varies in different groups of residents and in different types of 
pollution.  Second, the housing prices in the neighborhood are subject to the impacts of 
other development.  These impacts may be more pronounced than brownfield 
redevelopment.  Finally, unlike other hazardous sites, brownfields often have less 
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pollution and publicity.  The price impact of brownfields is relatively small compared to 
other impacts.  Therefore, it is easy to be interfered with and hidden by other impacts. 
 
5.2 Issues in the Methodologies and Future Improvements 
I realize the limitation in the methodologies for measuring benefits and costs and future 
work that could be done to improve this research.   
5.2.1 The Limitation of Hedonic Model in Evaluating Social Benefits 
The main limitation of using the hedonic model in evaluating social benefits of brownfield 
redevelopment is that it can be used only for ex-post research, because it builds on 
transactions data.  Analysts cannot project the potential benefits from a proposal based 
on hedonic analysis.  Its application is limited and cannot be applied to the optimal 
funding decision as mentioned in Chapter 3.  Further studies can build on more 
representative case studies to develop a rule-of-thumb method to determine public 
benefits. 
Analysts can use the hedonic model to measure the perceived risks/benefits, which are 
different from real risks/benefits.  Due to the varying level of environmental awareness, 
the perceived risks can be greatly different from real risks.  In order to fulfill the optimal 
funding decisions, future studies should explore ways to calculate the real benefits or 
adjust perceived benefits. 
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The hedonic model is dependent on a series of structural and neighborhood 
characteristics variables.  The model, in many cases, is sensitive to missing 
values/variables and recording errors.  Data availability and accuracy are always 
problems in the real world.  If these problems are not handled appropriately, the model 
results may be skewed. 
The model is sensitive to other development and amenity or disamenity factors in the 
region, such as metro stations, other brownfields, and industrial parks.  It is very difficult 
to differentiate the distance-to-brownfield effect from that to other sites, given the 
complexity of development dynamics.  By failing to consider other impacts, researchers 
may end up with a misleading conclusion.   
Further studies can create distance-year dummy for each year and test the significance, 
thus identifying the vintage year for price-distance effect change.  I did not include it, 
because the purpose of this study is to verify whether the cleanup and redevelopment 
have produced positive price impact and to quantify the benefits.   
5.2.2 Difficulty in Tracking Public Funds and Social Costs 
Brownfields are often located in low-income or distressed area, where they are eligible 
for other government subsidies.  It is difficult to differentiate the public funds for 
brownfield redevelopment efforts from those for other efforts.  For example, developers 
often tap low-income housing tax credits, zoning variance, and subsidized financing.  
Cities often offer zoning relief, which are difficult to quantify the costs.  
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5.2.3 Difficulty in Measuring the Full Public Benefits  
Many fewer transaction data are available for commercial properties than for 
single-family houses, which make it difficult to measure local businesses’ benefits from 
brownfield redevelopment.  Contingent valuation (CV) is available to measure directly 
the willingness-to-pay for environmental goods of the society, but it requires a greater 
effort and more financial resources than the hedonic model.  Although analysts often 
use CV for evaluating public benefits of large projects, most brownfield funds are too 
small to justify CV approach. 
All in all, it is difficult to realize the optimal funding decision based on the flow chart I 
proposed, due to measurement issues.  The major issue is to quantify all the public 
benefits accurately and beforehand.  A rule-of-thumb method in evaluating public 
benefits quickly may be useful in accomplishing the optimization of brownfield funding 
allocation. 
 
5.3 Policy Recommendation 
Building on the theoretical analyses and case studies in Massachusetts, I propose the 
following recommendations for brownfield policies. 
5.3.1 Optimize Brownfield Funding 
Brownfield financing programs have given an impetus to brownfield redevelopment 
through financial assistance.  However, the brownfield funding is limited.  There is 
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much room for improvement on current financing programs so as to maximize the return 
of the public financial resources (see Chapter 2). 
Cut back unnecessary funding 
As discussed in Chapter 3, some brownfield funding receivers would have redeveloped 
their projects even without brownfield funding.  By requiring developers who apply for 
funding to provide Proforma information, the government can evaluate the needs and 
priority of funding for the project and allocate the funding based on the framework 
proposed in Chapter 3.  For those positive private NPV projects, the government should 
not grant funding.   Generally speaking, for a brownfield of a larger parcel in a prime 
location, the remediation costs can be easily absorbed by the project. 
Prioritize funding allocation 
Funding cannot meet the needs of every redevelopment project, which contributes to 
positive social returns.  Currently federal funds are allocated to local agencies based on 
their proposals, and then local agencies distribute the financial resources to individual 
brownfield projects.  I could not find a consistent and quantitative way to evaluate the 
funding application and allocate the financial resource.  By adopting the principle of 
maximization of social returns, I propose a more straightforward and consistent method 
of allocating the funds.   
Optimize the Timing 
It is worth exploring when a redevelopment should be done from the social perspective.  
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Some redevelopment projects do not have positive NPSV, but may become positive in 
the future.  Three factors can change NPSVs.  (1) Environmental goods can be seen 
as a kind of luxury goods.  With the improvement of living standards, the 
willingness-to-pay for environmental goods will increase.  (2) The remediation costs 
may be reduced by the technological innovation.  (3) From the developers’ point of 
views, the current market may not support the redevelopment, but the project would be 
feasible if the market improves.  To optimize the timing, the government should have a 
strategic view of brownfield policy by projecting the market environment (rents, 
vacancies, construction costs, etc.), technology change, and people’s preferences.  It is 
evident that it makes no sense to fund a redevelopment project in a poor location with 
few health and environmental impacts, from the pure NPSV perspective. 
Integrate and Streamline Brownfield Financing Programs 
Current brownfield financing programs are scattered in different agencies.  The amount 
of each funding is relatively small.  In many cases, developers would rather not to apply 
for these funds, because of the time and efforts to make an application.  These funding 
programs would become more attractive for developers if they are integrated and 
streamlined.  First, the amount of each award would be larger.  Second, the 
transaction costs for developers and management costs for government could be 
minimized.  Finally, it would be easier for developers to apply to one or two agencies.  
Site Assessment Funds Focus on Marginal Sites 
Developers are ingrained with high perceived risks and would not touch brownfield sites, 
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especially for marginal sites, because marginal sites are in locations of week demand 
and/or have severe perceived environmental problems.  Although some marginal sites 
may be economically feasible after environmental assessment, developers tend to turn 
away from these deals first.  Site assessment funds should be focused on marginal 
sites, rather than sites in prime locations, which developers will definitely redevelop.  
5.3.2 Proliferate Non-financial Incentives 
Besides financial barriers, liability concerns and other non-economic factors are 
impediments for brownfield redevelopment.  Removing the uncertainties, such as 
liability mitigation, will achieve similar results as financial incentives, but does not require 
financial resources.   
Liability Mitigation 
Although developers can shield themselves from further action from states through no 
further action (NFA) and covenant not to sue (CNTS), states reserve the rights to re-open 
a case if new contamination is discovered.  Furthermore, citizens can sue developers in 
the future.  The uncertainties increase the risks of brownfield projects and, in turn, the 
costs of capital.  It is very important to design a legal structure to protect brownfield 
developers from the litigation for the pollution for which they are not responsible.   
Encourage Positive Innovation in Brownfield Redevelopment 
The government should encourage those innovations in brownfield redevelopment that 
reduce the risks and accelerated the redevelopment process.  Insurers have developed 
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innovative insurance products to reduce the risks of brownfield projects, such as 
coverage for cleanup costs overrun, costs to remediate undiscovered contaminants, 
liabilities due to incomplete or improper remediation and other risks.  For small projects, 
cities sometimes provide a guarantee so as to lower the lending costs.  Venture capital 
firms, such as Cherokee Investment and Brownfield Capital, have recently emerged in 
the brownfield redevelopment industry.   As an investment from the private sector, it 
reduces the risk exposure of governments and increases the financial resources for 
brownfield redevelopment.  
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